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LEVELING THE IP PLAYING FIELD
I. Introduction
The American economy thrives on an intellectual property
system that has been called "the envy of the world."1 For more than
two centuries, since Congress passed the first federal intellectual
property laws pursuant to its Article I powers,2 federal legislative
policy has been geared toward developing a legal regime that fosters
the development and public disclosure of inventions and innovations
by awarding rights and protections to their creators. The law was to
encourage inventors and innovators to create with confidence-to
ensure that they could receive the full fruit of their labor, and that
their labor would be justly protected against the myriad covetous
factions within the very national economy that the framers wished
such labor to strengthen.3 All market participants-whether private
or public-were thought to be subject to civil damages in federal
court for violation of intellectual property rights protected by federal
law; and it was assumed that the states were subject to those same
damages, notwithstanding the sovereign immunity granted them by
the Eleventh Amendment.4
However, in 1999 and 2000 a group of federal court decisions
"found that, despite expressing a specific intent to do so, Congress
had not appropriately abrogated state sovereign immunity from
damages suits for intellectual property infringements"5 in its Remedy
Clarification Acts of the early 1990s, 6 and struck those pieces oflegislation as unconstitutional The combined decisions have
1. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 8 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 House Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have power.., to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.")
3. THE FEDERALIST, NO. 43 (James Madison).
4. Robert Neufeld, Closing Federalism's Loophole in Intellectual Property Rights, 17
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1295, 1301-02 (2002).
5. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman).
6. See Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat.
2749 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511, 901(a), and 911(g) (1996))
[hereinafter CRCA]; Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-542,
106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), and
1127 (2000)) [hereinafter TRCA]; and Patent and Plant Variety Remedy Clarification Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2541(a)-(b), 2570 (1994) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994)) [hereinafter PRVA].
7. See generally Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating the PRVA), and Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating the TRCA), Alden v.
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rendered states and their institutions effectively immune to liability
for flouting federal statutory protections of private parties'
intellectual property rights. This result is so, even though the states
themselves can and do enjoy the full extent of those protections vis-A-
vis their own intellectual property. The result is a manifest imbalance
in the American intellectual property regime, wherein members of a
select class of market participants can (with exceedingly limited
exceptions) both benefit from their own intellectual property rights
and freely violate the intellectual property rights of private entities
without the fear of being forced to pay damages. States and their
subdivisions "now have the ability to infringe copyrights, patents and
trademarks with impunity,"8 based on their defense that the
Constitution immunizes them from legal reprimand. "In other
words," as Rep. Howard L. Berman noted, "states can have their
cake and eat it too."9
Moreover, "[t]he states are stockpiling plenty of cake these days.
Through their involvement in a growing number of commercial
enterprises, often in direct competition with private actors, states
have become huge beneficiaries of the intellectual property system..
. and increasingly use their immunity to shield themselves from
infringement liability."1° Rep. Berman cited one prominent example
of this phenomenon in a 2003 House subcommittee hearing:
Biomedical Patent Management Corporation, a San Diego-based
patent holding company, alleges that the California Department of
Health Services is infringing its patent for a method of assessing
placental dysfunction. The BPMC patent covers a groundbreaking
advance in prenatal screening for fetal chromosomal abnormalities,
especially Down's [sic] syndrome. Using the procedures described
by the patent, obstetricians make.., recommendations to pregnant
women on whether expensive invasive procedures . . . are
warranted. A majority of the prenatal screens performed
nationwide are licensed under this patent. The only large infringer.
• .is the California Department of Health Services, which, under
state law, has exclusive responsibility for prenatal screening. In
1997, the Department declined BPMC's offer to license the patent,
and in 1998 [BPMC] sued. As its first affirmative defense ...
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that federal law cannot mandate federal causes of
action to be heard in state courts), and Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th
Cir. 2000) (invalidating the CRCA).
8. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Smith).
9. Id. at 2. (statement of Rep. Berman).
10. Id (statement of Rep. Berman). Notes Rep. Berman, "State-owned entities
include publishing houses, radio stations, restaurants and hospitals. States develop drugs,
medical technologies, and commercial software products, and sell a variety of
trademarked merchandise." Id. at 2-3.
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California asserted that [the federal district court did] not have
jurisdiction under the 11th Amendment. When it became clear,
based on the 1999 Florida Prepaid decision that the State would
prevail, BPMC voluntarily dismissed the case. So, their patent is
infringed with impunity."
The ominous consequences of such an apparent rights imbalance
apply across the intellectual property spectrum. One congressional
witness, speaking in the context of copyrights, noted: "[b]y denying
[compensation] ... to copyright owners in cases where the infringers
are within the umbrella of a State's sovereign immunity the.., rulings
dilute the incentive for authors, performers, and producers to both
create and disseminate works for the benefit of the public.' 2 Notes
another congressional witness:
The system of [intellectual property] protection in the United
States ... assures innovative companies and individuals that they
will stand to reap the financial rewards if their new product or
service finds favor in the marketplace .... The prospect of state
infringement of intellectual property rights will have an adverse
effect on the level of investment in research and development of
new products and services. Companies will be reluctant to invest
the necessary funds in the development of new products when they
know ... a state or state agency can appropriate that product or
service for their [sic] own use, without licensing the technology or
paying royalties. As states increasingly face budget shortfalls, the
likelihood of their forays into patented or copyrighted commercial
ventures increases.
The potential danger from the imbalance does not stop there:
"By opening a constitutional loophole . . . in the U.S. intellectual
property regime, the Supreme Court's recent decisions raise serious
questions regarding U.S. compliance with international accords and
undermine the credibility of the United States in international
intellectual property diplomacy."'
14
11. Id.
12. Id. at 6 (testimony of Marybeth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights).
13. Id. at 57 (testimony of R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
14. Peter S. Menell, Symposium on New Directions in Federalism Economic
Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual
Property Rights, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1449 (2000). Writes Professor Menell:
[I]ntemational [IP] piracy has . . . led the United States to pursue . . . the
adoption of protection for intellectual property, and improvement of global
institutions governing [IP] rights. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty, for which the United States aggressively lobbied,
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Amid this atmosphere, members of Congress have repeatedly
proposed legislative solutions to close the loophole, but have met
with little success thus far-no legislation geared toward addressing
the 1999-2000 decisions has come to a full vote in either house of
Congress.15
The Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003,16
sponsored by Reps. Lamar Smith and Howard Berman in the House
and by Sen. Patrick Leahy in the Senate, is Congress's latest attempt
to restore parity between the holders of intellectual property rights
and the sovereign infringers of those rights. The most prominent
provision 7 of the bill gives states an incentive to voluntarily waive
their immunity to private damages suits for intellectual property
rights infringements, by conditioning state access to the full remedies
available under the intellectual property system on such a waiver-a
so-called "conditional waiver" provision.s
The legislation enjoys support from a broad swath of legal
scholars and industry executives, but it also retains its fair share of
detractors.' 9 The critics continue to question whether the 2003 IPPRA
established minimum criteria for [IP] regimes. Furthermore, the United States
has forcefully objected to perceived weaknesses in the [IP] laws of other nations.
Id. at 1448-49.
15. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th
Cong. (1999) [hereinafter 1999 IPPRA Bill]. The Senate and the House each introduced
new legislative drafts during the 107th Congress, neither of which was voted out of
committee. See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001, H.R. 3204 and S.
1611, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter 2001 IPPRA Bill], and Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2031, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter 2002 IPPRA
Bill].
16. H.R. 2344 and S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter 2003 IPPRA Bill].
17. The 2003 IPPRA Bill also incorporates a provision abrogating state immunity for
"unconstitutional" violations of intellectual property rights, actionable under the
Fourteenth Amendment--specifically, the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine and
Fourteenth Amendment due process protections. Further, it codifies a common law
doctrine permitting injunctions against state officials. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 190
(1908) (affirming the ability of private entities to sue non-consenting states for prospective
injunctive relief in federal court).
1& Compare 1999 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15 (conditioning states' ability to obtain
federal IP rights on their waiver of sovereign immunity).
19. The U.S. Copyright Office, the American Bar Association, the American
Intellectual Property Law Association, the Business Software Alliance, the Intellectual
Property Owners Association, the International Trademark Association, the Motion
Picture Association of America, the Professional Photographers of America Association,
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have all expressed support for the legislation. Tracy
Dreher Quigiey, Commercialization of the State University: Why the Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act of 2003 Is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 2001, 2025 (2004)
(citing 149 Cong. Rec. S7480 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)). Quigley further notes
that "it is likely that the bill has two strong advocates representing academic interests: the
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Bill will have any substantial impact on, as one Senate committee
witness argued, "a problem that quite simply does not exist."2 Some
argue that the bill's only impact will be to jeopardize the ability of
public entities like state universities to protect their intellectual
property research from infringement, claiming these entities will be
placed squarely in the middle of a federal-state power struggle.21 Still
others condemn the legislation on a more theoretical level,
maintaining that it is simply the latest inventive wave of an age-old
congressional attack on the sovereignty that they insist the states were
meant to enjoy under our constitutional system.22 This historical
attack has evoked increasing wariness from a Supreme Court
steadfastly dedicated to reinforcing the proper boundaries between
state and federal power-and it is this historical attack, the critics
argue, that the 1999-2000 decisions were meant to repel. The
constitutional battle, then, lies at the intersection of dual sovereignty
and intellectual property, legal regimes that each claim their fair
share of passionate defenders. The clash defies traditional party lines,
implicating more abstract but no less fundamental debates on the
proper role of intellectual property rights in the American federalist
system.
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the National Association of
College and University Attorneys (NACUA)," both of whom "have voiced support for
liability for state university infringement on private intellectual property rights." Id.
"Leading the charge against the bill," observes Quigley, "are the Association of University
Technology Managers, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant
Colleges, and the American Council on Education." Id. at 2026.
20. Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing on S.
1611 Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 32 (2002) [hereinafter 2002
Senate Hearing] (testimony of William E. Thro, Dep. State Solicitor for Commonwealth of
Virginia and Gen. Counsel for Christopher Newport Univ.). Despite mounting anecdotal
evidence to the contrary, the legislation's opponents maintain that state violations of
intellectual property law are neither numerous, nor egregious nor insurmountable under
existing state regimes of intellectual property protection. See also U.S. General
Accounting Office, GAO Rep. No 01-811, State Immunity in Infringement Actions, 9-12
(Sept. 2001) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01811.pdf [hereinafter 2001 GAO
Report] (finding that IP lawsuits involving states comprised less than 0.1% of the
approximately 100,000 IP suits brought from 1985 to 2001).
21. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 at 14-15 (statement of Leslie J. Winner, Vice
Pres. and Gen. Counsel for the Univ. of N. Carolina). But see, e.g., Quigley, supra note 19,
at 2017-21 ("increased commercialization, frequent litigation, reduced fair use and
research exemptions, and robust Eleventh Amendment immunity" give state universities
that participate in the intellectual property market unfair financial advantages over their
private counterparts).
22 See, e.g., William E. Thro, Immunity or Intellectual Property: The Constitutionality
of Forcing the States to Choose, 173 ED. LAW REP. 17 (March 13, 2003) (noting how the
theory of dual sovereignty anchors the Court's stringent protection of the states' sovereign
immunity).
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Many of the criticisms levied against the 2003 IPPRA Bill may be
valid, but there is one that does not survive close scrutiny-the
argument that the conditional waiver provision of the legislation
offends the Constitution. Commentators at once have argued that the
provision is not germane, is far too coercive, and is a mere pretense
designed to accomplish by circumvention what the courts have now
forbidden from being done by direct assault. 3
This note analyzes the constitutionality of the conditional waiver
approach touted in the 2003 IPPRA Bill, by examining its
justifications, its jurisprudential bases, and its propriety within the
American dual federalist system. Part II charts the major history of
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, and its increasing friction with
congressional attempts to protect intellectual property rights-a clash
culminating with the 1999-2000 federal court decisions, and their
aftermath. Part III explores the patchwork of legal theories that
combine to support the doctrine of conditional waiver of sovereign
immunity-a doctrine whose viability has yet to be examined by the
Supreme Court-and develops a working test to evaluate the
constitutionality of the 2003 IPPRA Bill's waiver scheme. Finally,
Part IV applies the working test to the conditional waiver of the 2003
IPPRA Bill, and addresses the constitutional arguments levied by the
legislation's supporters and detractors, concluding that Congress's
proposed solution to the federalist loophole in the American
intellectual property regime will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
II. The Intersection of State Sovereign
Immunity and Intellectual Property
The task of understanding the lengthy and often muddled history
of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence is monumental, but such
understanding is crucial to exploring why Congress has little room to
maneuver in trying to restore the balance of intellectual property
rights, and why it must tread carefully in doing so. The courts'
23. Id.; see also Jeffrey W. Childers, State Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of
Intellectual Property: Do Recent Congressional Attempts to "Level the Playing Field" Run
Afoul of Current Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence And Other Constitutional Doctrines?
82 N.C. L. REv. 1067, 1075-76 (2004) (arguing that the 2003 IPPRA Bill, like its
predecessor bills, does not "comport with the Court's current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence and also conflict[s] with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions," and
advocating "limit[ing] causes of action by a private party against a state to [acts
constituting] intentional infringement," limiting such suits "to those against states that
exhibit a pattern of infringing acts" and "allow[ing] suits only against those states with
inadequate remedies under state law").
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decisions sit like a minefield24 in the path of congressional regulation
of the intellectual property system, and they are vital to any
constitutional analysis of potential new methods of regulation.
Piercing the sovereign immunity shield is a condition precedent to
suing a state entity-no state can be hauled into court without its
consent, unless the claimant is another state or the federal
government, or the claim is made pursuant to one of a circumscribed
set of causes of action. With regard to claims under state law, a state's
power to insulate itself is almost plenary, subject only to
constitutional (both state and federal) and political constraints.
Further, state remedies for intellectual property violations are
negligible in scope and availability, for federal law preempts much of
the state intellectual property regime "and precludes 'state court
jurisdiction for suits arising under the patent and copyright laws."'
' 5
And if an aggrieved private person wants to sue a state on a federal
intellectual property claim in any instance, she must somehow
neutralize the immunity from federal claims that the state may exert
under the Eleventh Amendment. It must therefore be asked how and
when federal law allows recovery by private entities that have been
victimized by state infringement.
The federal courts have, in 200 years of constitutional
jurisprudence, crafted a sophisticated and increasingly complex
interpretive doctrine of Eleventh Amendment state sovereignty.
States cannot, of course, assert sovereign immunity when the
aggrieved party is another state or the United States-Article III,
section 2 of the Constitution grants federal jurisdiction over such
cases, 26 and the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not supplant
this provision. The courts' strict reading of the amendment stops
there, however. Though the text of the Eleventh Amendment z7
purports only to amend the Constitution by prohibiting suits against
24. John T. Cross, Suing the States for Copyright Infringement, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 337,
338 (2000).
25. Childers, supra note 23, at 1130 (quoting Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming
Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L REV. 1331,
1354-55 (2001)).
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend... to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party;-4o controversies between two or more states;-
between a state and citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states... and
between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.") (emphasis
added--italicized portions superceded by the 11th Amendment).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State").
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states by plaintiffs from other states or foreign nations, 28 the Supreme
Court in Hans v. Louisiana29 explicitly read beyond the literal text,
extending state sovereign immunity to apply in federal question cases
as well as diversity cases.0 The seminal Hans precedent is an iron bar
to private plaintiffs-whether diverse, non-diverse or foreign-who
wish to sue non-consenting states for damages in federal court. Unless
a plaintiff can find a way to pierce a state's immunity shield, making
that state amenable to suit in federal court, Hans provides the state a
complete defense against damages.
A. Pre-1999-2000 Situation
Hans reaches broadly, injecting its conception of Eleventh
Amendment immunity into all federal causes of action against states.
State sovereign immunity against private suit is not unlimited,
however. Federal courts may still hear private suits against states in
three circumstances: (1) if suit is brought against an individual state
official for equitable relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal
law,31 (2) if Congress acts to abrogate the state's immunity under its
power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment,3" or (3) if the state
voluntarily waives such immunity by consenting to suit.33 Moreover, a
plaintiff's ability to successfully sue depends greatly on the type of
relief she seeks-injunction or damages. A state may be sued
generally in federal court for prospective injunctive relief, but
Congress may only subject a state to suit for damages in those limited
circumstances when the state's immunity is either properly abrogated
or waived. 34 Federal courts have increasingly circumscribed the latter
two avenues in recent years, frustrating most attempts to hold the
states liable for damages when they violate federal law.
28. For case law concerning state immunity from suit by foreign nations, see
generally Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
29. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
30. Id. at 3, 9-10. The Court concluded that, despite the letter of the Eleventh
Amendment, it would be "anomalous" to allow citizens to force their own states into
federal court when citizens from other jurisdictions could not. See also Michael Peter
Hatzimichalis, Sovereignty, Federalism and Property in the Balance: A Paradox in the
Making, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 707, 746 (2000).
31. See infra Part A.II.1. and accompanying discussion of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.")
33. M.A. ex rel E.S. v. State Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2003).
34. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 717-28 (charting the text and history of state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment), Coll. Savings, 527 U.S. at 670.
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1. Suing for Injunctive Relief-the Ex parte Young Exception
In Ex parte Young, 35 the Supreme Court fashioned a narrow but
still-viable exception to the broad rule set forth in Hans. The case
"unveiled a great paradox" 6 that the Court solved by adopting a legal
"fiction": 37 state officials, in their individual capacity, remain subject
to suit when plaintiffs seek an injunction to block those officials'
continuing violation of federal law." The Court reasoned that when a
state official violates federal law or the Constitution, the official by
definition acts outside the scope of his or her official duties; for a state
cannot authorize its employee to violate such law.39 Therefore, "a
state can be sued in federal court for prospective relief by the simple
expedient of naming a state officer as the defendant."0
However, because injunctive relief is the sole remedy available
under the doctrine, Ex parte Young is only effective for a plaintiff
who is not seeking money damages41 or retroactive payments that will
be paid out of the state treasury.42 For the vast majority of claimants-
particularly in the realm of intellectual property-injunctive relief
from a federal court will do little if anything to compensate claimants'
losses due to infringement.
43
35. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (railroad company stockholders sued to enjoin the Minnesota
attorney general from enforcing new reduced state rate schedules, claiming the reductions
violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process liberties).
36. "To bring a valid suit under the Fourteenth Amendment there must be a state
action; however, if the State itself is performing the state action . . . the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against the defendant-state." Peysere/O'Connor, Ex parte Young:
A Mechanism for Enforcing Federal Intellectual Property Rights Against States, 27 (Oct.
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the AIPLA Quarterly Journal) [hereinafter
Peysare.O'Connor].
37. Id at 30 ("The Young doctrine is often referred to as a 'fiction' because the
authority for a Young cause of action seems to exist independent of explicit congressional
authorization.")
3& Young, 209 U.S. at 166.
39. Id. at 160. The Minnesota attorney general's unconstitutional conduct was
deemed not to be state conduct for purposes of Eleventh Amendment analysis-thus the
conduct could be enjoined in federal court because it never entered the ambit of sovereign
immunity.
40. Peysere/O'Connor, supra note 36, at 30.
41. See Coll. Savings, 527 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (deeming Young
doctrine to be ineffective for plaintiffs seeking damages); Scott D. Nelson, Big Brother
Stole My Patent. The Expansion of the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity and the
Dramatic Weakening of Federal Patent Law, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 271,282 (2000).
4Z Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("a suit by private parties seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment").
43. See e.g., 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Mark Bohannon, Gen.
Counsel and Sen. Vice President for Pub. Pol'y, Software & Information Industry Ass'n)
?O( ¢il
2. Suing for Damages-Abrogating State Sovereign Immunity
The Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged Congress's
ability to abrogate the states' immunity to suit in federal court for
violations of federal law, pursuant to its powers to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment" and a "corresponding
diminution of state sovereignty ... [from] the States' ratification" of
that amendment.45 In Fitzpatrick v. Blitzer, the unanimous Supreme
Court recognized federal jurisdiction over a suit brought by state
employees against Connecticut for its violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 6 The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' decision to preclude money damages, holding that "the
threshold fact of congressional authorization"4 7 was clearly present, in
legislation passed in this case pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which "necessarily limited" the "the Eleventh
Amendment and the principle of state sovereignty it embodies."48
The Supreme Court refined Fitzpatrick in Quern v. Jordan,49
declaring that Congress must indicate its intent to abrogate state
immunity, and ruling that because neither the statute involved in that
case (the Civil Rights Act of 1871) nor its legislative history clearly
demonstrated such intent, the statute could not abrogate a state's
immunity to suit in federal court!" The Court sharpened this
requirement in later cases, rejecting the notion that legislative history
was sufficient to demonstrate Congress's intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. 1
("Injunctions, while appropriate in some situations, simply do not satisfy the need for
effective deterrence and resolution of damages.")
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1 and 5; see e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356,356 (2001) (Rehnquist, J.) ("Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress
the power to enforce the substantive contained in § 1 by enacting 'appropriate
legislation').
45. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
46. Id at 456.
47. Id. at 452-53 (Rehnquist, J.) ("We think that Congress may, in determining what
is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.").
48. Id at 456.
49. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
50. Id. at 342-46.
51. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U.S. 223 (1989), and Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S.
96 (1989); see also Cross, supra note 24, at n.26 ("Instead, a statute would not be deemed
to abrogate immunity unless there was a 'clear statement' of Congress's intent in the
language of the statute itself.").
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In 1985, the Court ruled that congressional intent to abrogate
state immunity to suit must be explicitly and unambiguously stated in
the language of the statute itself-fashioning the so-called "clear
statement" rule.52 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, the Court
reiterated the Fitzpatrick holding that when Congress acts pursuant to
its power to implement the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it may abrogate a state sovereign immunity without the state's
consent. 3 The Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for damages under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, however, it also found that Congress
made no unmistakable statement of its intention to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment in the act.-4 Ultimately, the Court found that
the state had not otherwise waived its constitutional immunity-thus
the federal courts could have no jurisdiction over the claim.55
Appellate courts charged with applying Atascadero in the
intellectual property realm invariably ruled that Congress had not
clearly abrogated state sovereign immunity. 6 These rulings effectively
destroyed patent, copyright, and trademark rights-holders' ability to
sue for damages in federal court for infringement. In response,
Congress passed legislation in 1990 and 1992 to explicitly abrogate
state sovereign immunity from private suit for intellectual property
infringement, and to subject states to damages, costs, treble damages,
and attorneys fees.57
The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990"' amended the
Copyright Act of 1976,' 9 both by redefining the term "anyone" to
52. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242; accord Quern, 440 U.S. at 342-45, Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
53. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238.
54. Id. at 243 ("[I]t is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress'
[sic] intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh
Amendment. The requirement that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the
statutory language ensures such certainty.").
55. Id. at 238.
56. See e.g., Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 3331 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of
patent infringement diversity suit against state under existing patent law, finding plaintiff's
argument of abrogation untenable under Atascadero), Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep't.
of Trans., 919 F.2d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming lower court's dismissal of patent
infringement suit against state entity on similar grounds), Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871
F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that language of 1976 copyright act did not unequivocally
abrogate sovereign immunity, as required by Atascadero).
57. See Robert C. Wilmoth, Toward a Congruent and Proportional Patent Law:
Redressing State Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 55
SMU L. REv. 519,534 (2002).
58. Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) [hereinafter CRCA] (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 511,901(a), and 911(g) (1996)).
59. Codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332.
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include "any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State acting in his or her official capacity"' (and also
using the same redefinition for "any person") 61 and by expressly
abrogating states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 62  Congress
promulgated the CRCA amendments to the Copyright Act through
its Article I commerce power, basing its method on the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 amendments, 63 which the Supreme Court had twice cited
as an example of proper abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity under Atascadero.64
The Patent and Plant Variety Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 6
amended the federal Patent Act 66 and effectively overruled the Chew
and Jacobs Wind decisions 67 by adding section 271(h) to define the
term "whoever," as used in section 271(a), to include "any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity." 68 The PRVA
further added language that was nearly identical to that of the
CRCA's section 511(a), to explicitly abrogate state sovereign
immunity.69
Finally, the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 199270
amended sections 32(1) and 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act) 71 by defining "any person" and "person" to include
60. CRCA, supra note 58, § 501(a).
61. Id § 901(a).
62. Id. §§ 511(a) and 911(g)(1) ("Any state, and instrumentality of a State, and any
officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official
capacity, shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal
court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for a
violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner ... ").
63. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1087
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2000)).
64. See Peysere/O'Connor, supra note 36, at 14, n.69; see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223,229-30 (1989).
65. Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
2541(a)-(b), 2570 (2000) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (2000)).
66. Codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
67. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
68. Section 271 of the Patent Act details the types of infringement that are
considered unlawful, chief among these being the unauthorized use, offer to sell, or sale of
any patented invention, as well as contributory infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271; see
Wilmoth, supra note 57, at 534.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2000).
70. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (2000)).
71. Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000).
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"any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her
official capacity." The TRCA added an abrogation provision to the
Lanham Act,72 using the same type of language as its fellow Remedy
Clarification Acts.
Together, the Remedy Clarification Acts purported to realign
the power structure in the intellectual property regime that the post-
Atascadero courts had thrown into chaos, placing back in the hands of
the federal government the ability to abrogate state sovereign
immunity for infringement of intellectual property rights. As will soon
be shown, however, this realignment lay upon a cracked foundation. 73
3. Suing for Damages-State Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity itself, both of the federal government74 and
of the states,75 "is a personal privilege which [the sovereign] may
waive at pleasure. . 76States may waive their immunity, consenting
to suit in federal court by making a general appearance in litigation
before the court, consenting via state statute or constitutional
provision, or otherwise waiving in the context of a federal program.7
As the Atascadero Court held, however, a state's waiving immunity
before its own court will not constitute a waiver of immunity before
the federal courts.78 Courts are further instructed to "'indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of sovereign immunity," 79 and
in light of this guidance, appellate courts "have acknowledged that
72 Id. § 1122.
73. See Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and
University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467,
n.36 (2000).
74. See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000) (federal government has consented to suit in the
Court of Federal Claims for patent, plant variety and copyright infringement).
75. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S 436 (1883) (holding Rhode Island's voluntary
intervention in lawsuit constituted effective waiver sovereign immunity waiver). Sovereign
immunity's waivability differentiates it from other defenses that cite defects in subject
matter jurisdiction. Jennifer Poise, Holding the Sovereign's Universities Accountable for
Patent Infi'ngement after Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, 89 CALL. REV. 507,
520 (2001).
76. Clark, 108 U.S. at 447.
77. Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n., 359 U.S. 275,276 (1959).
78. 473 U.S. at 241 (holding that an interstate compact's "sue-and-be-sued" provision
will be deemed to waive a compacting state's 11th Amendment immunity); accord Fla.
Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per
curiam).
79. State Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d at 345 (quoting Coll. Say., 527 U.S. at 682).
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the 'waiver by the state must be voluntary and our test for
determining voluntariness is a stringent one." ''
a. Express Waiver
A state can expressly waive its immunity from suit by so stating
in a statute or constitutional provision, but to be effective, such
waiver must contain "an unequivocal indication that the State intends
to consent to federal jurisdiction that would otherwise be barred by
the Eleventh Amendment., 8' The sovereign's intent to waive
immunity must be unmistakably clear; ambiguous and general
consent to suit provisions, standing alone, are insufficient to waive
Eleventh Amendment immunity."' Federal courts read this
requirement strictly, finding state waiver "only where stated 'by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from
the text as (will) leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.'"3
Additionally, "[a] state's constitutional interest in immunity
encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be
sued." 4 "Thus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision
to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must
specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court.""
Nor does general language in a state constitution like "suits may be
brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as may be
directed by law" constitute a waiver of that state's immunity in
federal court, as such language merely authorizes that state's
legislature to waive immunity.8s
80. Id. (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Penn, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d
Cir. 2001)).
81. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238, n. 1.
82. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 306 (1990).
83. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151,
171 (1909)).
84. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 (emphasis in original); accord Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999).
85. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241 (emphasis in original).
86. Id., citing Cal. Const. art III, § 5. Though a state statute empowering a public
body to "sue and be sued" indicates that the state has waived immunity, such general
waiver still does not meet the stringent Edelman requirements. See f7a. Dep't of Health &
Rehab. Serv., 450 U.S. at 147-50 (holding that neither participation in federal program nor
a related agreement to obey federal law were sufficient to waive 11th Amendment
protection).
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b. Parden and the Constructive Waiver
A state can likewise implicitly waive its sovereign immunity by
taking action in connection with a lawsuit that is inconsistent with
that immunity, such as suing an infringer in federal court or otherwise
affirmatively invoking federal jurisdiction.8' Furthermore, until 1999, 8
Supreme Court precedent held that a state could be deemed to have
constructively waived immunity from suit in federal court. This
doctrine, articulated in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State
Docks Department,9 presented an attractive alternative to abrogation
for holding states accountable for intellectual property infringement. 90
The Parden Court reasoned that the states, in ratifying the
Constitution, necessarily ceded a portion of their sovereignty when
they granted Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
under Article 1.91 The states thus empowered Congress to create a
right of action against interstate railroads-the legislation
"conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce
upon amenability to suit in federal court. . .. "92 By engaging in
interstate commerce by rail, "Alabama. . .accepted that condition
and thus ... consented to suit." 93 The Parden Court held that when a
state leaves a "sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into
activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
regulation as fully as if it were a private" entity.94 "[T]he States by
venturing into the congressional realm 'assume the conditions that
Congress under the Constitution attached." '9'
87. Cross, supra note 24, at 362. In New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Laser Aesthetics, Inc., 63
F. Supp. 2d 1240 (C.D. Cal. 1999), for example, a district court denied a state's request to
dismiss an action brought to declare one of its patents invalid. The court explained that, by
voluntarily seeking a patent, the state waived immunity to any suit adjudicating the
validity of that patent, lest the state be allowed to "take the good without the bad." See
also, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (defendant state's removal of suit
to federal court constituted waiver of sovereign immunity to claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law).
8& See Coll. Savings analysis, infra at part II.B.2.
89. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Coll. Say., 527 U.S. at 680. In Parden, plaintiff
railroad employees brought suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act against the
State of Alabama; the state owned and operated the employer railroad and claimed
immunity from enforcement of the act in federal court. Parden, 377 U.S. at 184-85.
90. Poise, supra note 75, at 521.
91. Parden, 377 U.S. at 190-92.
92. Id. at 192.
93. Id. at 192.
94. Id. at 196.
95. Id. (quoting Petty, 359 U.S. at 281-82).
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Like the abrogation method promulgated in the Remedy
Clarification Acts, however, Parden and the doctrine of constructive
waiver are no longer good law.96
B. 1999-2000 Decisions
On June 23, 1999, the Supreme Court handed down three
decisions in what critics have since lamentably called the Court's
"federalism trilogy."' Each decision was decided by an identical five-
to-four vote, and each engendered strong dissenting views. The next
year, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit faithfully applied the
holdings of the trilogy. Together, these decisions occupy a "critical
place ... in the current sovereign immunity landscape" 98 and in the
area of intellectual property, having effectively sounded the death
knell for the Remedy Clarification Acts and Congress's
comprehensive post-Atascadero attempt to subject states to damages
for their infringement of intellectual property rights.
1. Florida Prepaid-Weakening Congress's Abrogation Ability
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank,99 the respondent sued under the PRVA,
alleging that the finance methodology of the petitioner-an agency of
the State of Florida-for a college savings program infringed its
patent. On the heels of the Court's monumental decision in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida,1°° the petitioner moved for and was denied
dismissal in district court, a decision upheld on appeal in the Federal
Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings, striking down the
PRVA as unconstitutional.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth
criteria to determine whether the legislation validly abrogated state
sovereign immunity: (1) whether, pursuant to Atascadero, Congress
made its intention to abrogate the immunity unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute, and (2) whether, under Seminole Tribe,
96. See infra Part II.B.2.
97. See e.g., Hatzimichalis, supra note 30, at 747 (Referring to Florida Prepaid,
College Savings, and Alden). Writes Hatzimichalis, "[w]ith respect to property rights, the
Court's trilogy may have the effect of dividing the Constitution against itself." Id. at 47.
98. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Paul Bender, Prof. of Law, Ariz.
State Univ. Law Sch., and Counsel to Meyer & Klipper, PLLC, on behalf of the Prop.
Owners Remedy Alliance).
99. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
100. 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996) (holding that Congress has no power under Article I to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, and can thus abrogate only in a remedial fashion,
pursuant to § 5 of the 14th Amendment).
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Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power (i.e. section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment) to remedy a specific due process
violation.'°'
The Court found that under the Atascadero standard, the PRVA
did articulate Congress's "unmistakably clear" intention to abrogate
state Eleventh Amendment immunity. '0 It also found, however, that
the legislation improperly employed Congress's Article I commerce
powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent infringement
suits, an act forbidden by Seminole Tribe.' 3 Moreover, even if the
legislation could have been construed as remedial under section 5, it
failed because it was not congruent and proportional to the ends
Congress sought.' 4 The Court conceded that respondent College
Savings Bank and the United States were correct in that PRVA
would be constitutional, if it could be properly construed as remedial
legislation appropriately enacted under Congress's section 5 power.1
It also acknowledged that patents "have long been considered a
species of property" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause; thus state patent infringement could be deemed an
unconstitutional deprivation of property.' 6
Under the Court's City of Boerne congruence-and-
proportionality test, however, such remedial legislation must be
"appropriate."' '° The Court applied three criteria to determine
whether the PRVA qualified as "appropriate remedial legislation":
(a) whether congress had established a strong record of patent
infringement by the states; (b) whether the abrogation was drafted in
such fashion as to apply only to those states that do not provide a
state remedy for infringement; and (c) whether the abrogation
applied only against non-negligent state infringement. ' Congress,
said the Court, failed to identify any pattern of patent infringement
by the states of any kind, let alone the kind of conduct that would rise
to the level of unconstitutional deprivation of property. 9 Congress
101. F/a. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635.
102. Id
103. Id at 636. The Court made clear that, under Seminole Tribe, neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause provided Congress with authority in the PRVA
to abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims, no matter how
explicit Congress made its statutory intent.
104. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997).
105. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637.
106. Id at 642.
107. Id at 637-39.
10& Id at 640-45.
109. Id. at 640 ("Testimony before the House Subcommittee in favor of the bill
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"barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent
infringement and hence whether the States' conduct might have
amounted to a constitutional violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment."" Further, there was no evidence that such remedies,
although inconvenient and undermining of the uniformity of the
patent law, were constitutionally inadequate.' Finally, the legislative
record of the PRVA suggested that most state infringement was not
intentional, but rather innocent or at worst negligent.1
The Court concluded that "the [PRVA's] apparent and more
basic aims," were not to remedy state deprivation of property that
violates due process, but rather, "to provide a uniform remedy for
patent infringement and to place States on the same footing as private
parties under [the patent] regime. These are proper Article I
concerns," wrote the Court, "but that Article does not give Congress
the power to enact such legislation after Seminole Tribe. ,'
3
2. College Savings and the Death of Parden's Constructive Waiver
In the companion case of College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,14 the Court
affirmed the Third Circuit's holding that the TRCA's provisions-
subjecting the states to suit under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for
false or misleading advertising-were unconstitutional."5 Writing for
the Court, Justice Scalia held the TRCA to be an invalid abrogation
with respect to false or misleading advertising claims, both because
such alleged acts did not implicate a constitutional "property" interest
(the Court never the reached question of infringement), and because
the state of Florida had not validly waived its sovereign immunity."
6
The Court rejected petitioner College Savings Bank's argument
that it was entitled to recovery on the basis of deprivation of property
acknowledged that 'states are willing and able to respect patent rights.' The fact that there
are so few reported cases involving patent infringement claims against the states underlies
the point.")
110. Id at 643. Testimony given by PRVA supporters at 1992 House hearings
conceded that some uncertain state actions such as a deceit suit, an unfair competition suit,
or an action in restitution could be available for victims of state patent infringement. The
overall effectiveness of the remedies therefrom, however, remained and remains an open
question. Id at n.8.
111. Id at 644; see also Peysere/O'Connor, supra note 36 at 20.
112 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
113. Id at 647-48.
114. Id. at 666.
115. Id. at 675, 691.
116. Id. at 691.
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without due process of law. n1 7 The rights petitioner alleged to be at
issue-"a right to be free from a business competitor's false
advertising about its own product," and a "right to be secure in one's
business interests"-do not qualify as property rights, said the
Court. 8 The Lanham Act's false advertising provisions bore no
relationship to any right to exclude others (the hallmark of a
constitutionally protected property interest), and respondent Florida
Prepaid's alleged false advertising intruded upon no interest over
which petitioner had exclusive dominion." 9 Likewise, though the
assets of businesses are property, and any state taking of those assets
is a deprivation, business in the sense of "the activity of doing
business, or... of making a profit" is not property at all-therefore
the state's impingement of such interest via false advertising did not
deprive petitioner of property."'
Relying on the Parden precedent, College Savings Bank and the
United States rejoined that an implied or constructive waiver is
possible when Congress unambiguously subjects to private suit a state
that voluntarily chooses to engage in certain federally-regulated
conduct.'2' The Court disagreed, noting that even when supplemented
by a requirement of an Atascadero-style congressional statement of
intent to subject the states to suit, a Parden-style waiver is simply
incompatible with the proper role of congressional legislation vis-A-vis
state sovereignty m  "The whole point of requiring a 'clear
declaration' by the State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in
fact consents to suit," wrote Justice Scalia.' 2 "But there is little reason
to assume actual consent based upon the State's mere presence in a
field subject to congressional regulation."' 24 Justice Scalia further
noted that it is irrelevant in the sovereign immunity context whether
"the asserted basis for constructive waiver is conduct that the state
realistically could choose to abandon, that is undertaken for profit,
117. Id. at 675.
l1& Id at 672.
119. Id at 673.
120. Id at 675. For all it decided, College Savings never expressly held that the
TRCA's abrogation of sovereign immunity in trademark infringement actions was an
invalid exercise of Congress's power. However, given the sweeping breadth of the
Seminole Tribe and Fla Prepaid decisions, it is all but certain that, if this issue were
pressed before the Supreme Court, the Court would decide in favor of invalidating
TRCA's abrogation provision respecting trademark infringement suits.
121. Id at 676.
122 Id at 681-83.
123. Id at 680.
124. Id
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that is traditionally performed by private citizens and corporations,
and that otherwise resembles behavior of market participants. ' '' ln The
Court therefore expressly invalidated the Parden constructive waiver
as an anomalous glitch in the evolving jurisprudence of sovereignimmunity.' 26
In the context of sovereign immunity, a constructive waiver
therefore must be treated the same as an improper abrogation-
neither will be permitted under the Supreme Court's precedent to
circumvent a state's immunity from damages suits.l 7
3. Alden and Federal Causes of Action in State Courts
The Court's decision in Alden v. Maine,tn handed down on the
same day as Florida Prepaid and College Savings, provided much of
the doctrinal foundation for the Court's sweeping rulings.' 9 In Alden,
employees of the State of Maine filed suit in state court, alleging state
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.'3 The Court affirmed the
Maine courts' decisions dismissing the employees' claim, holding that
Congress has no Article I authority to subject non-consenting states
to private suit for damages in their own courts."'
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy maintained that the
"sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited
by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment"; rather, "the States'
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which
the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution ... "'3
Thus, "for the first time the Court recognized state sovereign
immunity existing independent of the Eleventh Amendment."' 33
125. Id at 683 (holding the "market participant" cases from the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to be inapposite in the sovereign immunity context).
126. Id at 680-683 ("We have never applied ... [we] in fact have narrowed [Parden] in
every subsequent opinion in which it has been under consideration .... [W]e cannot
square Parden with our cases requiring that a State's express waiver of sovereign
immunity be unequivocal .... [I]n formally overruling Parden we do no more than make
explicit what [Seminole Tribe] implied.").
127. See id at 683. ("Forced waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of the
same coin--they are the same side of the same coin.")
128. Id at 706.
129. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 201. Plaintiffs originally brought the action in federal district court
prior to Seminole Tribe-the district court dismissed the suit, and plaintiffs subsequently
filed the same action in state court.
131. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 712.
132 Id at 713.
133. Mark D. Shaffer, Reining in the Rehnquist Court's Expansion of State Sovereign
Immunity: A Market Participant Exception, 23 WHITHER L REV. 1011, 1022 (2002) ("This
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4. Chavez
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on the
constitutionality of the CRCA, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has applied the Florida Prepaid and College Savings decisions
and arrived at much the same holding. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press
14
indicates that the CRCA's provisions with respect to state sovereign
immunity are all but dead-letter. In Chavez, the plaintiff sued the
University of Houston under the CRCA, alleging that that state
university had infringed the copyright of her book.135 A Fifth Circuit
panel had previously ruled in favor of the plaintiff, based on the
subsequently-discarded Parden theory,36 but the Supreme Court
remanded that decision in the wake of Seminole Tribe, and it was
subsequently overruled by the court of appeals.'37 Another Fifth
Circuit panel, hearing the case on a second remand, ordered the
plaintiff's claim dismissed, upholding the State of Texas's sovereign
immunity defense. m The court adhered to the Florida Prepaid
analysis, applying the same three-part congruence-and-
proportionality test derived from City of Boerne.
13 1
Noting the opinion's "exhaustive discussion of the abrogation
issue," one commentator counsels that "[t]he Chavez decision ...
could well serve as a blueprint for the other courts" to apply the
Florida Prepaid doctrine'
new conception of sovereign immunity simultaneously helps the Court expand the scope
of the immunity and opens the Court to greater criticism of its judicial activism.").
However much of Congress's current attempts at legislation may be geared toward
remedying the practical effects of the 1999 decisions on IT rights, it is the Court's
indication that it would no longer be limited by the text of the Eleventh Amendment that
has raised eyebrows among critics who have chafed under the rulings of a Rehnquist Court
supposedly devoted to eschewing judicial activism.
134. 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the Arts, 199
F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign
immunity in copyright infringement suits).
135. 204 F.3d at 603.
136. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Chavez
I], overruled by Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
Chavez II].
137. See Chavez II, reh'g granted, judgment remanded by Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,
180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Chavez III] (en banc) (remanding Chavez II in
light of F/a Prepaid and Coll. Savings).
13& Chavez I, 204 F.3d at 608.
139. Id at 605-08.
140. Cross, supra note 24, at 355.
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C. The Current Situation
The 1999-2000 decisions emasculated the Remedy Clarification
Acts, leaving intellectual property rights-holders essentially
defenseless against infringement of those rights by the states or state
entities. "[A] person who wishes to enforce federal intellectual
property rights against a state university cannot sue the university
itself in federal court. And in the case of federal patent and copyright
claims, a person cannot sue in state court either, because federal
courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over those claims." '41
Although the Florida Prepaid Court indicated that the states
themselves can and do provide remedies for state transgressions that
are no longer justiciable under federal law, "the availability of
monetary awards in State courts is highly doubtful,"' 42 given that
"States would also have to waive their sovereign immunity in their
own state courts."'43 Moreover, "[t]raditional state intellectual
property law theories are also quite limited, and the broader tort of
misappropriation faces a substantial risk of preemption."' 44 At the
same time, "Congress probably could not demonstrate at the present
time that adequate state remedies are unavailable to intellectual
property owners when states interfere with their property,"'145 and
thus will likely continue to be incapable of compiling the mountain of
evidence of unconstitutional state violations necessary to justify a
Fourteenth Amendment abrogation provision of the "across-the-
board" type-the type that was promulgated in the now-defunct
Remedy Clarification Acts.146
141. Bone, supra note 73, at 1480-81. See also, e.g., Wilmoth, supra note 57, at 572-76.
142. 2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
143. Appendix to 2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20 (responses of Marybeth Peters to
questions submitted by Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("This scenario is undesirable given the lack of
expertise among state court judges in intellectual property. It would also be problematic
because there would be no effective avenue for federal judicial review of state court
decisions."); see also 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Paul Bender)
("[s]tate remedies are out of the picture"); but see 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1
(statement of Leslie Winner) (suggesting that natural political constraints would impel
states to properly and effectively enforce intellectual property rights in their own courts).
144. Bone, supra note 73, at 1496-97.
145. Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual
Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEx. L. REV. 1037,
1082 (2001).
146. See id. at 1106 ("The remedies that an infringing state entity must provide to an
intellectual property owner. .. to comply with the state's constitutional obligations, and
thereby negate Congress's power to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity, are
substantially less attractive than the federal remedies available to intellectual property
owners against private infringers.").
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Conversely, private actors remain liable, both in state and in
federal court, when they infringe the intellectual property rights of
states and state entities.1 47 In the absence of some sort of "protective
legislation, intellectual property holders [have been] forced to gamble
with creative and unproven legal arguments . . . a gamble most
innovators would arguably not want to attempt, ' 48 and which, in any
case, tends to defeat the goal of uniformity in intellectual property
law that the Framers envisioned.
III. Conditioning the States' Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
A legislative "solution to the current state of affairs is crucial for
intellectual property holders because [the Florida Prepaid] cases
allow states to inflict great harm on individuals who have made a
large personal investment in an innovation."' 49 The "catch," as it were,
is that such legislation cannot escape judicial invalidation unless it
abides by the principles announced by the courts. As noted, a state
can only be sued for damages in federal court if its sovereign
immunity is either properly abrogated or waived. However, given that
the stringent requirements of City of Boerne and its progeny render
general abrogation impracticable, and that the states' intention to
waive immunity will no longer be constructively inferred under any
circumstances, Congress needs an alternative means to impel the
states to waive their immunity to damages suits.
Soon after the Supreme Court handed down its federalist trilogy,
the Senate introduced legislation meant to rectify the practical
imbalance created by these decisions.' 5 The sponsors and supporters
of the 1999 IPPRA Bill attempted to circumvent the roadblock
erected by the Florida Prepaid decisions by proposing, inter alia, that
the Congress utilize a conditional waiver to reach its goal: Congress
would make the states' receipt of federal benefits contingent on the
states' voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity to suit, essentially
through a contractual agreement.51 The specific conditional waiver
method proposed in the prototype 1999 IPPRA Bill was hotly
debated at the congressional committee level-the relatively extreme
147. See 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Mark Bohannon).
148. Allison K. Jones, New Property in a New Age of Federalisrre The Fight for
Intellectual Property Protection, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 513, 535 (2001).
149. Id at 542
150. 145 Cong. Rec. S13555 (daily ed. Oct 29, 1999).
151. See Hearing on Intellectual Property Rights of the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Prop. of the House Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 47 (2000) [hereinafter 2000
House Hearing] (statement of Prof. Daniel Meltzer, Harvard Law School).
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and confrontational approach of the legislation may well have
prevented it from emerging from the committee stage intact. 52 Yet
supporters of a legislative response to the intellectual property
imbalance continue to tout conditional waiver as the most effective
means of leveling the playing field while avoiding the type of
abrogation that the federal courts will no longer countenance. A
modified and abridged conditional waiver remains the core
component of the 2003 IPPRA Bill.
The ultimate efficacy of the conditional waiver scheme employed
in the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act is a daunting
issue, one on which both supporters and detractors of the bill have
weighed in heavily. But that efficacy (or lack thereof) is largely
beyond the scope of this note. Such discussion may help answer
whether the provision should or needs to be included in the
legislation; but the discussion becomes largely moot unless one can
predict whether the conditional waiver arrangement can, if adopted
by Congress, withstand constitutional challenge in the courts. An
understanding of the legal precedent and theory that underlie the
burgeoning doctrine of conditional waiver-itself borne from the
"conditional spending" and "unconstitutional conditions" doctrines
articulated by the Supreme Court-is central to any prediction about
the constitutionality of its usage.
A. Conditional Waiver Theory-Finding a Workable Solution
In his College Savings opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the United
States' assertion in an amicus brief that Supreme Court precedent-
namely, the Court's decisions in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Commission153 and South Dakota v. Dole'---permits Congress,
pursuant to its Article I powers, to extract constructive waivers from
states:155
Under the Compact Clause . . . States cannot form an interstate
compact without first obtaining the express consent of Congress;
the granting of such consent is a gratuity. So also, Congress has no
obligation to use its Spending Clause power to distribute funds to
the states; such funds are gifts. In the present case [College
152- See Wilmoth, supra note 57, at 584; see also infra, Part IV.A.
153. 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (bi-state commission created pursuant to interstate compact
had consented to suit by virtue of amenability provision attached to congressional
approval of compact).
154. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (Congress, in exercise of its spending power, may condition
payment of federal funds to states on the states taking action which Congress could not
expressly require).
155. Coll. Sav., 527 U.S. at 686.
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Savings], however, what Congress threatens if the State refuses to
agree to its condition is not the denial of a gift or gratuity, but a
sanction: exclusion of the State from otherwise permissible
156
activity.
Though the opinion condemned constructive waiver as an
illegitimate means for plaintiffs to skirt sovereign immunity
protections and haul states into federal court, it never challenged the
central tenet that state sovereign immunity to suit is "a personal
privilege which [a state] may waive at pleasure."'57 "The decision to
waive that immunity . 'is altogether voluntary on the part of the
sovereignty.". 5 8
As Justice Scalia observed, the Supreme Court has firmly
recognized that Congress can condition receipt of certain federal
benefits on a quid pro quo from the recipient. The interaction is
deemed contractual,159 for the parties each engage voluntarily in the
exchange-this is the theory that underlies the Court's jurisprudence
in the realm of conditional spending' 6° When he introduced the 1999
IPPRA Bill, Senator Leahy suggested that this precedent be
expanded to apply to other kinds of federal grants to the states-that
Congress could prompt states to waive their immunity to suit as a
condition for receiving federal intellectual property rights (which, as
supporters of the bill assert, are a "gift or gratuity' 61 of the type
mentioned by Justice Scalia). 62
The Supreme Court "has never clearly articulated a rule for
determining when Congress may use federal incentives to pressure
the constitutional rights of states.'1 6 Therefore, determining what test
will be used to gauge the constitutionality of a conditional waiver is
156. Id. at 686-87.
157. Id. at 675 (quoting Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)); see also infra, part
II.A.3.
15& Id. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1858)).
159. See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State
Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 304 (2002).
160. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 203.
161. See, e.g., 2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20 (testimony of Marybeth Peters)
(asserting that Congressional authority to provide protection for intellectual property
rights is entirely permissive); 2000 House Hearing, supra note 151 (statement of Daniel
Meltzer) (arguing that Congress need not create IP rights, and thus the federal IP rights
the states enjoy under federal law are gratuities, the disbursement of which may be
conditioned on state waiver of sovereign immunity).
162. 145 Cong. Rec. S13557 (daily ed. Oct 29, 1999); see also Cross, supra note 24, at
371.
163. Bohannan, supra note 159, at 305.
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relegated to the realm of prediction.' 6' As Atascadero noted, however,
the Court's "test for determining whether a State has waived its
immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is," at the very least, "a
stringent one." 165
Conditional spending seems a natural starting point for the
courts in analyzing conditional waiver, but jurisprudential history
demonstrates that the former doctrine is not without its weaknesses.
Nor will the use of a conditional waiver as a means of making states
amenable to suit escape constitutional risk in any event; for as
opponents of the proposed legislation note, legislatively-imposed
conditions that improperly elicit a waiver of constitutional rights will
inflict "unconstitutional conditions" on the rights-holders, and will be
struck on that basis.
1. Dole and Conditional Spending
As College Savings noted, the Petty and Dole rulings evince the
Supreme Court's recognition that Congress can use its powers
granted under the Constitution-in the case of Petty, powers under
the Compact Clause, and in the case of Dole, powers under the
Spending Clausel6--to extract concessions from state entities in
exchange for federal benefits. The Dole decision in particular speaks
to a long-standing history of contractual agreements between the
federal government and the states in the realm of congressional
appropriation, one that dates back to the beginning of the American
republic.1 67 "No federal appropriations program has been invalidated
164. Most commentators do believe that, although no Supreme Court case is directly
on point, dicta from the Atascadero, Alden and College Bank decisions (among others)
indicate recognition of some congressional "power to condition federal benefits on the
States' waiver of a constitutional immunity like the Eleventh Amendment." Cross, supra
note 24, at 373-74; see also 2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of Daniel
Meltzer).
165. Coll. Savings, 527 U.S. at 675 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241). Justice Scalia
writes:
Generally, we will find a waiver either if the State voluntarily invokes ourjurisdiction, or else if the state makes a 'clear declaration' that it intends to
submit itself to our jurisdiction. Thus, a state does not consent to suit in federal
court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation... [nor]
merely by stating its intention to 'sue and be sued,' or even by authorizing suits
against it 'in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Id at 676 (citations omitted).
166. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3. and U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, respectively.
167. Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of State Sovereign
Immunity: The Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
439, 455 (2002) ("[During the infancy of the republic,] Madison argued that Congress
could tax and spend only to carry out an enumerated power. Hamilton countered that
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by the Supreme Court on federalism-based grounds since 1936,"'1
6
when the Court in United States v. Butler invalidated a federal
conditional spending program. 169
Cognizant of this history, Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth a test
in Dole to ascertain whether Congress's use of conditional spending
comports with the outer limits of its authority: (1) "the exercise of the
spending power must be in pursuit of the 'general welfare' (the
"general welfare" prong); (2) the conditioning of state receipt of
federal funds must be set forth unambiguously, "enabling the states to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation"' ' 0 (the "cognizance and exercise" prong); (3) the
conditions on the grant must be sufficiently related to federal interest
being promoted by the condition (the "germaneness" prong); (4) the
conditions must not be barred by other constitutional provisions, such
as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (the
"no independent bar" prong); and (5) the conditions must not be
''coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion"' (the "non-compulsion" prong)."'
Although the Dole test limitations were presented in the context
of a condition attached to an exercise of the spending power,'
taxing and spending were separate powers that Congress could use for any purpose that
furthered the general welfare. Congress soon adopted Hamilton's meaning and gave infant
States large sums with strings attached.").
168. Jennifer Cotner, How the Spending Clause Can Solve the Dilemma of State
Sovereign Immunity From Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713, 726 (2001) ("The
Court has been very frank that this power gives the federal government the ability to carry
out its objectives constitutionally even when it would not be able to do so directly"). See,
e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (finding that federal employment
tax whose proceeds went to states with unemployment compensation systems that met
federal standards did not offend the 10th Amendment); Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (upholding condition of federal funds on state
officers' agreement not to participate in political activities); and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (upholding federal program conditioning state or municipal receipt of
public works grants upon agreement that 10% of funds must go to minority businesses).
169. 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding a federal conditional spending measure to be
impermissibly coercive, but affirming that Congress could spend for any purpose that
promotes the general welfare, regardless of whether the expenditure directly furthered an
enumerated power).
170. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
171. Id. at 211 (citing Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590). Some commentators argue
that the "voluntariness prong" is not a true component of the Dole test, given that "[T]he
Court has not prescribed any bright-line formula with which to evaluate this factor; it is
usually decided on a case-by-case basis." Cotner, supra note 168, at 728.
172 See generally 483 U.S. at 203. The Dole Court upheld Congress's conditioning
state receipt of federal highway construction funds on the states' enactment of laws
increasing their legal drinking age to 21. The terminology of the fifth prong of the Dole
test in particular--regarding a measurement of the level of coercion necessary to
supporters of the IPPRA argue forcefully that "the same limitations
should apply to conditions attached to grants of patent rights, and
even when the condition amounts to a waiver of sovereign
immunity." '173 "The reason that the Dole test should be [extended to
test the constitutionality of conditional waiver] is that the general
problems with conditional waivers all inhere in the Dole test."' 74
2. The Lower Courts
Unlike the Supreme Court, lower courts have dealt directly with
the question of conditional waiver of sovereign immunity, within the
greater context of Dole-type spending. Numerous courts of appeals
have concurred with the Third Circuit's relatively simple formulation
gleaned from College Savings-that before a court may determine
that a state has waived its sovereign immunity by accepting a
congressional gift or gratuity: "(1) Congress must state in clear and
unambiguous terms that waiver of sovereign immunity is a condition
of receiving the gift or gratuity; (2) in accepting the gift or gratuity,
states must exercise that choice knowingly and voluntarily, fully
cognizant of the consequence-waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity; and (3) the federal program bestowing the gift or gratuity
must be a valid exercise of Congress's authority."' 75
transform a coercive condition into compulsive one--implicitly betrays an
acknowledgement by the Court that "coercion" (meaning, at its root, pressure exerted on
one party to effect its compliance with the desires of the exerting party) is in itself not
inherently wrongful. Indeed, the phenomenon of coercion seems a necessary component
in any conditional relationship, given that all such relationships involve a consequential "if
. . . then" association. The "coercion" question of Dole, then-of any constitutional
analysis of the permissibility of conditional relationships between parties-is not whether
the condition at issue is "coercive" (for surely, it will be), but rather whether the condition
is impermissibly coercive under the Constitution. See Lynn A. Baker and Mitchell N.
Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and
How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 517-21, n.291
(2003). In other words, whether the action coerced is in fact compelled, such that the
coerced actor is left with "no choice" but to abide by the condition-in such instance, the
condition at issue would be unconstitutionally coercive, i.e., "compulsive." See Berman, et
al., supra note 145, at 1151-61. The test developed in this part and employed in part
IV.B.1. is grounded in this conception of coercion.
173. Roger C. Rich, Can Congress Require that States Waive Their Immunity to Private
Lawsuits in Exchange for Receiving Federal Patent Rights?, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 607,
645 (2002). See also Cotner, supra note 168, at 740 (calling conditional waiver a "logical
continuation" of Supreme Court precedent); Cross, supra note 24, at 372-75. But see
Berman et al. supra note 145, at 1151 (questioning if Justice O'Connor, the lone Dole
dissenter, would reject extending the Dole test outside the conditional spending context).
174. Rich, supra note 173, at 14.
175. State Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d at 346. In State Operated Scl. Dist., the state of
New Jersey motioned for dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that the state had violated the
Individuals With Disabilities in Education Act, arguing that Congress failed to validly
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A serious question arises, however, as to whether the Dole test,
taken alone or as modified by lower courts in the conditional waiver
context, has the potency necessary to legitimately appraise the
IPPRA's conditional waiver. As said, the Supreme Court has never
struck down a federal conditional spending provision under Butler-
and as a result, the lower courts "have proved remarkably willing to
let Congress use conditional spending to override state sovereign
immunity,"1 76 even though the Court has never specifically weighed in
on Dole's interaction with such immunity. The Dole test's "general
welfare" prong in particular is "not a meaningful restriction, because
Congress shapes the concept of welfare. The courts are required to
defer substantially to Congress [in this] regard . . ."'77 Likewise, the
"cognizance and exercise" prong is easily satisfied so long as Congress
makes its intention to condition receipt of a benefit on state waiver of
immunity explicit in the statute. This concept is little more than a
transfer of Atascadero to the conditional waiver doctrine.
Commentators argue that "Dole just makes it too easy for
Congress to circumvent constitutional limitations on its powers of
direct regulation,"' 78 and that the operative terms of the Dole test
have never been adequately applied. 79 For instance, Justice
abrogate state sovereign immunity in the statute. The Third Circuit held it unnecessary to
analyze the propriety of the abrogation, or to even arrive at the abrogation issue at all,
because New Jersey had in fact conclusively waived immunity, id. at 351; accord Douglas
v. Calif. Dept. of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 271 F.3d 910
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 924 (2002). The court interpreted Coll. Savings to mean
that "when Congress bestows a gift or gratuity, to which the state is not otherwise entitled,
with the condition that the state waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the state
accepts that gift or gratuity," the state cannot then assert an immunity defense against a
claim brought under the statute that creates the conditional waiver. State Operated Sch.
Dist, 344 F.3d at 345-46; accord Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 171-72 (3d Cir.
2002); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000).
176. Gibson, supra note 167, at 468 (noting that at least 16 federal courts, including all
13 circuit courts, have upheld federal grants conditioned on state waivers of immunity to
suits involving the funded programs); accord Susan M. Luken, Irreconcilable Differences:
The Spending Clause and the Eleventh Amendment Limiting Congress's Use of
Conditional Spending to Circumvent Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
693, 708 (2002). Gibson notes, however, that lower courts are saddled with the task of
deriving from a few sentences in Dole principles to determine when a conditioned benefit
is too coercive, in the sovereign immunity context or otherwise. Given the relatively clear
precedent that sanctions Congress's use of conditional spending generally, courts charged
with applying Dole are not eager to deviate from that precedent, lest they be forced to
fashion abstract germaneness and coercion justifications for such deviation. See Cross,
supra note 24, at 488-492.
177. Cotner, supra note 168, at 727.
178. Berman et al., supra note 145, at 1143.
179. See generally Baker & Berman, supra note 172.
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O'Connor herself, dissenting in Dole, lambasted the Court's
formulation of the "germaneness" prong in particular, arguing that
the federal government's conditional spending scheme could specify
how states spend the money conferred, but could not impose other
requirements beyond such specifications.' 8° In the areas of both
germaneness and coercion (arguably the only areas where the test
could be used to reasonably strike down legislation), many observers
insist that a more stringent, incisive analysis of the pressures placed
on states is needed to examine the constitutionality conditional
waiver and the conferral of conditional offerings in general.18 ' The
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, they write, should be the
barometer by which any conditional waiver is judged' 2
3. Nollan/Dolan and Unconstitutional Conditions
Surely, "there are limits on Congress's power to impose
conditions on federal benefits. If there were not, government could
use the lure of its largesse to achieve goals that it would be
constitutionally prohibited from implementing by direct
legislation. ' ' 3 Unconstitutional conditions doctrine is geared toward
preventing such abuse, mandating that "the government may not
require a person to give up a constitutional right.., in exchange for a
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit
sought has little or no relationship" to the right ceded.' 8
180. 483 U.S. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indeed, "Justice O'Connor's approach
to germaneness is influential because it appears to be more in-line with other decisions by
the Court. Although these decisions were made in contexts other than the
congressional ... spending power, they delineate the difference between a permissible
condition on governmental power and an impermissible condition." Rich, supra note 173,
at 641-42 (touting the decision in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), as
the standard by which germaneness should be analyzed).
181. Berman et al., supra note 145 at 1143-44; cf Thro, supra note 22 (arguing that the
IPPRA impermissibly coerces state concessions, under the Supreme Court's doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions).
182- See Bohannan, supra note 159, at 305.
1.83. Cross, supra note 24, at 371-72.
184. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (holding that a city failed to
meet its burden to justify a Fifth Amendment taking of petitioner's property). Jeffrey W.
Childers observes:
Historically, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied to
conditions placed on government benefits that restrict the rights of individuals.
The doctrine has also been used, however, to invalidate legislation that
conditions receipt of federal benefits, and thus shifts power from the states to the
federal government in violation of federalism principles.
Childerns, supra note 23, at 1111.
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,lu5 rendered mere days after its Dole decision, best
illustrates the doctrine. In Nollan, the state of California had
conditioned private property owners' building of a larger beach house
on their beachfront lot on the owners' conveyance of a public
easement across a portion of their private beach. The Court held the
condition unconstitutional, concluding that even if the state could
constitutionally deny the building permit requested by the owners in
pursuance of promoting the public's visual access to the beach, the
permit could not be conditioned on those owners giving up a portion
of their property rights unless such condition served the same
governmental objective as the development ban."' As the Supreme
Court later articulated in Dolan v. City of Tigard, without such an
"essential nexus" between the condition and a legitimate purpose of
government, the action amounted to little more than extortion. '
Though the subject matter of unconstitutional conditions arises
from the takings context (as opposed to spending), the language
articulated in Nollan concerning the relationship between benefit and
constitutional right does potentially supplement Dole's more
generalized germaneness and non-compulsion requirements. One
observer writes: "[W]hile the doctrine generally applies in the context
of individual rights, it should be equally applicable to the
fundamental aspects of a State's sovereignty."'" Backers of this
analysis cite language from the College Savings opinion itself to
support this claim-language which itself cites the Dole opinion:
[I]n cases involving conditions attached to federal funding . . . 'the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as
to pass the point at which "pressure turns into compulsion." In any
event, we think that where the constitutionally guaranteed
protection of sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion
is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver
185. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
186. Id. at 838.
187. See idi at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-88.
188. Thro, supra note 22, at 38; accord Bohannan, supra note 159, at 305 ("Although
the doctrine is used most often to evaluate conditions placed on government benefits that
burden individual rights, it also may invalidate legislation that conditions the disbursement
of federal benefits in a away that shifts power from the states to the federal government in
violation of constitutional principles of federalism."). See also Rich, supra note 173, at 642-
43 ("[T]he germaneness test [of Nollan] is an indicator of when a condition operates as
circumvention"); Childers, supra note 23, at 1111, n.287 (the above-quoted language in
Coll. Savings "suggests... that the Court has elevated state sovereign immunity to the
level of a constitutional right").
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destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the
exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity.' 89
Unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in short, would prevent the
very type of coercion by a governmental entity that, in the sovereign
immunity context, would amount to the same side of Justice Scalia's
"abrogation coin"-assuming, that is, that sovereign immunity is
treated like other constitutional rights.' 90
It should be noted that, whereas the legitimacy of the Dole test
suffers because critics may deem it too easy to pass, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine has its own problems-more
than one commentator has referred to it as a befuddling, inarticulable
area of jurisprudence.'91 Critics nonetheless suggest that because
Nollan's unconstitutional conditions analysis scrutinizes germaneness
and coercion more pointedly, it can still help refine the critical prongs
of the Dole test. Specifically, they take the Nollan opinion to mean
that:
(1) coercion is better understood as turning upon the wrongfulness
of the act threatened, not upon its magnitude ([which Dole]
measured as a percentage of the entire benefit available to the
recipient); (2) the relevant elements to be assessed for germaneness
are the condition and the denial of the benefit offered, not the
condition and the conferral of the benefit; and (3) the lack of
germaneness has evidentiary significance in supporting an inference
that the conditional offer is coercive, but has no operative
significance of its own.'92
B. Combining the Tests
One observer argues that "the conditional waiver scheme must
more closely parallel Supreme Court Spending Clause jurisprudence
than Takings Clause jurisprudence,"' 9' and that therefore Dole's
indulgent rational basis standard for judging germaneness of
legislation should hold; but there is a strong argument that the
specific states' rights preserved by the Eleventh Amendment are
189. Coll. Savings, 527 U.S. at 687 (citations omitted) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at
211(quoting Steward, 301 U.S. at 590)).
190. See Bohannan, supra note 159, at 308.
191. Cf Cross, supra note 24, at 372 ("[T]he case law dealing with unconstitutional
conditions is horribly muddled"); Berman et al., supra note 145, at 1131 ("[I]n recent years
several leading constitutional theorists have argued that there is no unconstitutional
conditions problem, and that assessment of conditional benefit cases must be
particularized to the narrow doctrinal context in which they arise.")
192. Berman et al., supra note 145, at 1145.
193. Cotner, supra note 168, at 730.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 127:475
simply too vital to the constitutional balance to be so easily
disregarded.1 4
The Nollan/Dolan doctrine would inject into Dole a more
rigorous evaluation of germaneness and non-compulsion, requiring
both a (1) tight fit or "essential nexus" between the federal offering
conferred (or withheld) and the state concession extracted (in this
case, waiver of an explicit constitutional right), and (2) an analysis of
whether the condition is overly coercive (i.e., compulsive) hinging not
on the magnitude of the threat, but on whether the federal
government could constitutionally take the threatened action at all,
irrespective of the state's waiver-i.e., whether the offering is a "gift
or gratuity" that the federal government may rescind at its pleasure,
or a "benefit" or "otherwise lawful activity" to which the state would
presumably be entitled. This analysis would apply whenever the
Congress attempts to extract waiver of state sovereign immunity as a
condition of a grant, whether that grant is money, intellectual
property rights, or the ability to recover damages for infringement of
those rights.
Combining the Dole, Nollan, Dolan and appellate court
precedents, an applicable constitutionality test for conditional waiver
begins to emerge: a sort of "Dole with bite" test'9' that adds no new
prongs, but rather refines the old ones to comport with the residual
area of congressional action vis-A-vis state sovereignty left untouched
by the federalist trilogy.
IV. Constitutional Analysis of the 2003 IPPRA's
Conditional Waiver Provision
In late October 1999, a few months after the Supreme Court
handed down the Florida Prepaid, College Savings and Alden
decisions, Senator Patrick Leahy-leading a small but vociferous
congressional backlash against the federalist trilogy 16-introduced
the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999. The
draft bill was Congress's first legislative proposal to rectify via
conditional waiver the imbalance in intellectual property rights left by
the federalist trilogy-a fact evinced by the aggressive wording and
broad scope of its "opt in" scheme. The scheme conditioned states'
194. Thro, supra note 22, at 38-39.
195. Cf Baker & Berman, supra note 172, at 511.
196. Cf Wilmoth, supra note 57, at 576. "Though surprised by the [federalist trilogy]
decisions, [Arlen Specter] stated he was 'even more surprised by the lack of reaction by
Members of the House and Senate to this usurpation of Congressional authority.'
20051 LEVELING THE IP PLAYING FIELD 509
ability to participate in the federal intellectual property system on
their complete waiver of sovereign immunity from private
infringement actions.'1 The coercive aspects of this solution, however
were largely disproportionate to the problem they were intended to
solve, and arguably rose to the level of punitive compulsion. Had
Congress implemented the legislation, the "opt in" scheme likely
would have failed the "Dole with bite" constitutionality test when
challenged in court.
In June 2003, the House and Senate introduced identical
modified versions of the 1999 IPPRA.198 This current version of the
197. See generally 1999 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15. The 1999 bill also took advantage
of the small avenue for abrogation left open by the 1999-2000 decisions, codifying a
"limited abrogation" provision that allows private entities to sue states under federal law
for actual unconstitutional due process or takings violations of their intellectual property
rights (as opposed to statutory violations) under section 5 of the 14th Amendment. Id., tit.
II; see also Neufeld, supra note 4, at 1309. The abrogation provision is lauded as "perfectly
congruent to the Fourteenth Amendment by abrogating only in cases where the State has
violated" the amendment by depriving someone of property without procedural due
process, or by taking property without providing adequate compensation. Cross, supra
note 24, at 388; accord Berman, et al., supra note 145, at 1085 ("Such an approach is
plainly--even elegantly--constitutional").
The new abrogation provision is arguably mere legislative affirmation of a
recourse whose viability was never in doubt-namely, the ability to sue under the
Fourteenth Amendment directly in the most egregious cases of infringement, such that no
widespread legislative record of unconstitutional conduct would be necessary to effect a
congruent and proportional remedy. See Wilmoth, supra note 57, at 583 ("The prohibition
claims to reach as far as the Constitution's limits, but does nothing more than parrot the
constitutional guarantees."); 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Marybeth
Peters) ("The burden.., of proving the necessary elements.., to overcome the State's
immunity merely shifts from Congress to the individual right holder/plaintiff, who, in
accordance with the ruling in Florida Prepaid, must demonstrate that there are not
adequate state remedies and that the infringement was non-negligent").
The 1999 bill further codified the injunctive relief afforded private claimants by
Ex parte Young. Like the proposed abrogation provision, this codification of the common
law also presents little constitutional problem but makes no substantive headway, existing
primarily to shield existing Ex parte Young construction against any potential judicial
incursion. See 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Marybeth Peters). This
codification has since become section 4 of the 2003 IPPRA Bill, which clarifies the
remedies available when state officers or employees violate intellectual property laws. See
2003 IPPRA Bill, supra note 16, § 4 (providing that in suits against state officers or
employees, remedies under federal IP statutes "shall be available against the officer or
employee in the same manner and to the same extent as such remedies are available in an
action against a private individual in like circumstances"--including monetary damages,
injunctive relief, and destruction of infringing articles-as well as providing for the
awarding of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in cases of willful infringement).
In short, both the abrogation and injunction codification provisions of the 1999
have survived essentially untouched in the succeeding IPPRA bills, and remain in full
force in the 2003 bill. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
19& See generally 2003 IPPRA Bill, supra note 16. The 2003 bill is nearly identical in
format to the 2001 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15 (introduced simultaneously in the House
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IPPRA bill builds on the central theory of its 1999 predecessor-
namely, the idea that the best way to restore the proper legal balance
between state and private actors in the realm of intellectual property
is for Congress to induce the states to waive their constitutional
immunity to suit for infringement. Where the legislation differs from
its predecessor, however-and necessarily so from a constitutional
standpoint-is in the precise condition it employs to induce the
waiver. Unlike the 1999 legislation, the 2003 IPPRA Bill's conditional
waiver is elegantly tailored to the precise problem its sponsors wish it
to solve: it restores states to an equal footing in federal court with
private parties, allowing states to recover damages for infringement
only if they have agreed to subject themselves to the very same
damages remedy sought by private parties.
A. 1999 IPPRA Bill-The "Opt-In" Method
The main feature of the 1999 IPPRA Bill was a series of "opt-in"
provisions conditioning states' access to any additional intellectual
property rights-in fact, to the federal intellectual property system in
general-on their full and complete waiver of sovereign immunity
from actions in patent, trademark and copyright infringement.199 The
strongly-worded bill purported to "provide States with an opportunity
to participate in the Federal intellectual property system on equal
terms with private entities, '"" by requiring States to assure to the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and the Registrar of
Copyrights that the state "[will agree] to waive sovereign immunity
from suit in Federal court in any action against the State or any
instrumentality of official of that state (1) arising under Federal
intellectual property law; or (2) seeking a declaration with respect to
a Federal intellectual property right.
' 1
Had the 1999 IPPRA Bill become law, however, the legislation's
conditional waiver provision likely would not have withstood
constitutional scrutiny. True, as stated earlier, the "general welfare"
and "cognizance and exercise" prongs of the "Dole with bite" test will
and the Senate in Nov. 2001) and the 2002 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15. See Wilmoth, supra
note 57, at 584.
199. See generally 1999 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15.
200. Id. § 2(b)(1).
201. Id. § 111(b). A state asserting its sovereign immunity in court despite its
agreement would: (1) have any of its instrumentalities' pending federal IP applications
stripped, (2) be barred from recovering damages or other monetary relief in any IP
enforcement action levied by the state in the five-year period preceding the wrongful
assertion of immunity, and (3) not be allowed to opt back into the federal IP system for
one year. Wilmoth, supra note 57, at 581.
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conceivably tolerate all but the most poorly-worded of statutes-thus
they presented no obstacle to constitutionality of the 1999 IPPRA
Bill's conditional waiver. Further, the legislation did not seem to
offend the "independent constitutional bar" prong, "which simply
indicates that Congress may not condition [federal grants] on
unconstitutional activities, such as discriminating or inflicting cruel or
unusual punishment." Where the bill faltered, however, was in the
areas of germaneness and coercion. Because the legislation entailed
an all out conditioning of state intellectual property rights on the
state's waiving of sovereign immunity, instead of simply its receipt of
the remedies normally accorded, the provision was simply too
punitive in nature, and therefore disproportionate.m The waiver
provisions explicitly applied not only to infringement suits, but also
actions challenging the validity of an intellectual property right.24 A
state would be required to provide an assurance every time it applied
for a federal intellectual property right, and in the case of patents,
plant variety protection and trademarks, when the state sought to
record an assignment or other transfer of the right." The assurance
would last for the duration of the right being sought.26 The
consequences of a state's breach of such assurance were severe: all
pending applications for intellectual property protections under
federal law would be deemed abandoned.2 Further, even if a state
that breached its assurance changed its mind and filed a waiver, the
statute prohibited the state from acquiring intellectual property rights
for a year."
This waiver system raised significant problems in meeting the
requirements of the "essential nexus" or "germaneness" prong of the
"Dole with bite" test. The statute instituted a blanket waiver
provision, requiring a state to waive its immunity in all intellectual
property suits in order to gain any intellectual property rights.29 As
one commentator noted, "[i]f a State chooses to avail itself of only
202. Cotner, supra note 168, at 728.
203. Jones, supra note 148, at 540.
204. Cross, supra note 24, at n.230. See also Quigley, supra note 19, at 2022-23.
205. 1999 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15, §§ 131-136.
206. Jones, supra note 148, at n.540.
207. 1999 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15, § 113(a).
20& Id. § 113(c).
209. Id. § 111. "Thus, [asserting] sovereign immunity in a patent suit (in spite of an
express assurance to the contrary) would cause the State to lose its right to recover
damages (including treble damages), attorneys fees, or costs in infringement suits relating
to any of the copyrights or trademarks owned before the wrongful assertion." Wilmoth,
supra note 57, at 582.
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one or two types of federal intellectual property, this blanket waiver
is grossly out of proportion to the risk of an improper grant of rights
to the state. 210
Likewise, the rescission of a state's ability to participate in the
federal intellectual property system at all (rescinding even injunctive
relief) unless it completely waived immunity in federal court to suit in
all cases of intellectual property infringement, could hardly be said to
"provide States with an opportunity to participate in the Federal
intellectual property system on equal terms with private entities.,
211
Rather, it threatened complete emasculation of the states' ability to
create and protect intellectual property of any kind under federal law
unless they abided by the "opt in" conditions. Such an arrangement
portended to serve a penalty on the states for their invocation of a
constitutional right (not a Dole-style contract) and seriously offended
212the non-compulsion prong of the "Dole with bite" test.
Although "[a] strong argument can be made that the level of
inducement for States to waive their sovereign immunity in [the 1999
IPPRA Bill] was comfortably within 'the appropriate powers of
Congress'," even supporters of the legislation conceded that this
treatment of the states threatened to enfeeble the very appeal to
fairness they had touted as its principal attraction.2 4 Indeed, many
observers argue that, regardless of whether states may behave as
market participants, the assumption that states should be treated like
the private citizen in any endeavor or activity is not a settled
doctrine. 21' Even assuming arguendo, however, that Congress can and
210. Cross, supra note 24, at n.236. Traci Derher Quigley notes that:
In arguing that S. 1835 would fail a test for germaneness, Cross condemned the
waiver condition as not truly connected to the benefit of abrogating immunity
because "[t]he condition that [S. 1835] would place on that benefit... applies not
to the State's own creative activity, but instead protects the creative activity of
others."
Quigley, supra note 19, at 2023 (quoting Cross, supra note 24, at 385-86).
211. 1999 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15, § 2(b)(1) (listing the purposes of the act).
212. Cf, Berman, et al., supra note 145, at 1158-60.
213. 2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive
Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association) (quoting Florida v.
Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927) (80% credit against a federal estate tax for payments on state
inheritance taxes that induced 36 states to amend their laws upheld as valid)).
214. See 1999 IPPRA Bill, supra note 15, § 2(a)(12); accord 2002 Senate Hearing, supra
note 20 (statement of Paul Bender ("Article I . . . empowers, but does not require,
Congress to offer Federal intellectual property protection to any person on such terms as
appear reasonable and appropriate to serve the public interest"); 2002 Senate Hearing,
supra note 20 (statement of Paul Bender); see also Cross, supra note 24, at 582 (citing 145
Cong. Rec. S13555, supra note 150 (statement of Sen. Leahy)).
215. See Coll. Savings, 527 U.S. at 685-86 (Scalia, J.) ("In the sovereign-immunity
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should properly pursue establishing a rough parity of litigation rights
for all participants in the federal intellectual property system, a
regime treating states demonstrably worse than the private parties
would deny that regime's endorsers of any legitimate claim they could
have of desiring a fair and equal playing field.216 Opponents of the
legislation could have easily argued that if the bill sponsors' goals
were truly benevolent, then its provisions would have accorded the
states rights in intellectual property that were, at the very least,
comparable to those of private market participants. The "draconian
consequences" provided for in the 1999 IPPRA bill "betray[ed] a
hostility to the doctrine of state sovereign immunity," and could have
added fuel to the notion that the legislation was merely the latest
congressional pretext to its age-old attempt to destroy state
sovereignty.217
The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee in late
1999, where it languished. Though the House Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property did
deliberate on the issue of state sovereignty and the protection of
intellectual property rights in 2000,218 the Senate bill remained in
committee until the end of the 106th Congress, never coming to a
vote or even receiving consideration in a Senate committee hearing.219
B. 2003 IPPRA Bill-"Equal Remedies"
The 2003 IPPRA Bill was introduced simultaneously in the
House and Senate on June 5, 2003.m The current legislation replaces
the "opt in" scheme with a "remedies equalization" method that
"place[s] states and private entities on the same footing by limiting
context, moreover, 'evenhandedness' between individuals and States is not to be expected:
'[T]he constitutional role of the States sets them apart from other employers and
defendants."') (citations omitted); see also, Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and
Intellectual Property, 73 S. CALL. REv. 1161, 1167 (2000).
216. See Berman, et al., supra note 145, at 1160 ("Competitive balance would be
restored more perfectly were the Leahy bill amended to grant intellectual property
protection even to non-waiving states, but to limit their remedies to those that would be
available in suits against them. To go the additional distance of withholding intellectual
property protection smacks of a penalty.")
217. Cross, supra note 24, at 582.
21& See generally 2000 House Hearing, supra note 151.
219. Cf 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (appended statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy). See also Steve Malin, The Protection of Intellectual-Property Rights In a Federalist
Era, 6 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH J. 137, 177-81 (2002) (examining the 1999 IPPRA
Bill).
220. See 149 Cong. Rec. H5042 (daily ed. June 5, 2003); 149 Cong. Rec. S7479 (daily
ed. June 5, 2003).
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relief available to a state that has not waived its sovereign immunity,"
and affording non-waiving states the ability to recover only the same
injunctive relief that private entities could recover against them.21
Section 3 of the bill-entitled "Intellectual Property Remedies
Equalization"-amends titles 15, 17, and 35 of the United States
Code. The section makes a state or state instrumentality ineligible to
obtain federal legal remedies for infringement of patents, trademarks
and copyrights created by the state or state instrumentality (or legally
or beneficially owned) on or after January 1, 2004-that is, except
upon proof that on or before the later of January 1, 2006 or the date
the infringement commenced, the state: (1) "waived its immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment and any other doctrine of sovereign
immunity from federal infringement actions brought against the state
or an instrumentality thereof"; and (2) "made such waiver in
accordance with its constitution and laws of the [s]tate, and remains
effective." 'm Section 3 also requires that the limitations on remedies
will not apply to exclusive rights if "the limitation would materially
and aversely affect a legitimate contract-based expectation in
existence before January 1, 2004" or if "the party seeking remedies
was a bona fide purchaser for the value of the [right], and at the time
of the purchase, did not know and was reasonably without cause to
believe that a state or State instrumentality was once the legal or
beneficial owner of the right." '
This "new, less confrontational version of the condition-and-
waiver approach.., has been praised for its 'elegan[t] symmetry,"' 24
for Section 3 "gives the states the right to obtain patents, copyrights,
and trademarks and to obtain injunctive relief in federal courts even
if they never waive their sovereign immunity, '" ' and takes care to
honor legitimate contract-based expectations and the rights of bona
fide purchasers. The "proportional incentive '"' of this "carefully
balanced" ' provision withstands both the constitutional rigors of the
221. Neufeld, supra note 4, at 1310.
222. 2003 IPPRA Bill, supra note 16, § 3(a)-(c).
223. Id
224. Wilmoth, supra note 57, at 584 (quoting 2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20
(statement of Michael K. Kirk)); see also Quigley, supra note 19, at 2024 (noting how
under the 2003 IPPRA Bill, "a non-waiving state is limited to the same remedies afforded
to individual plaintiffs whose intellectual property is infringed by the state.")
225. 2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of Michael K. Kirk).
226. Id
227. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
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"Dole with bite" test and the criticisms of commentators opposed to
its adoption.
1. "Dole With Bite's" Test of Section 3
The conditional waiver provision of the 2003 IPPRA Bill, like its
1999 counterpart, easily satisfies the first three prongs (the unaltered
prongs) of the "Dole with bite" test. The courts will almost certainly
defer to Congress's assessment that its conferral of damages remedies
under intellectual property law is in pursuit of the "general welfare,"
given that Congress already made such policy apparent in the
Remedy Clarification Acts.m Likewise, Section 3 fulfills the
"cognizance and exercise" prong, for it articulates the date by which
states must waive their sovereign immunity, the scope such waiver
must encompass, the method by which the states can manifest their
waiver, the consequences of failure to waive or rescission of waiver,
the point in legal proceedings at which the limitation on remedies
may be raised by a claimant, and the exceptions to such limitations.229
Finally, Section 3 complies with the "no independent bar" prong
because, as established earlier, the state action Congress is attempting
to induce-state waiver of sovereign immunity-is an activity states
have every right to take.]3°
The questions that remain-the questions to which "Dole with
bite" is geared toward answering-are whether: (a) the condition that
Section 3 imposes on the states is germane to federal interest being
promoted, measured by the strength of the relationship between
condition extracted and the denial of the offering (not its conferral);
and (b) whether the condition is so coercive as to pass the point at
which "pressure turns into compulsion," an analysis that turns not on
the magnitude of the threatened rescission, but rather on its
wrongfulness-i.e., whether the offering is a "gift or gratuity" that
228. Cotner, supra note 168, at 728-29 ("Congress established that making all parties,
including the states, amenable to federal intellectual property laws is in the general
welfare by passing several different statutes designed to accomplish that goal; therefore,
the first prong of the test should be easily satisfied by this scheme.").
229. 2003 IPPRA Bill, supra note 16, § 3.
230. See discussion, infra part II.A.3. Some have argued that the Tenth Amendment's
generalized restriction of the powers of the federal government could constitute the
independent constitutional bar to Section 3's conditional waiver; but the Dole Court and
other holdings make clear that the Tenth Amendment was not an independent
constitutional bar to conditional spending measures. See, e.g., New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that Congress cannot "commandeer"
state legislatures to enforce radioactive waste regulatory program, but that coercive
monetary access provisions are consistent with power of federal government).
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Congress may constitutionally rescind, or conversely, a "benefit" or
"otherwise lawful activity" to which a state is entitled.
a. Germaneness-the "Essential Nexus"
Section 2 of the 2003 IPPRA Bill identifies four congressional
purposes promoted in the act, the first oriented squarely toward the
equal remedies provision:
To ... help eliminate the unfair commercial advantage that States
and their instrumentalities now hold in the Federal intellectual
property system because of their ability to obtain protection under
the United States patent, copyright, and trademark laws while
remaining exempt from liability for infringing the rights of others.23'
The condition that the equal remedies provision extracts, of
course, is state waiver of sovereign immunity; states refusing to waive
their sovereign immunity lose their ability to recover damages for
infringement of their intellectual property. The issue, then, is whether
there is an "essential nexus" between state waiver of sovereign
immunity and the federal government's denial of a damages remedy
for infringement, such that the touted purpose of the equal remedies
provision will be served. Would withholding a damages remedy from
the states, as a theoretical matter, help to eliminate their unfair
commercial advantage? The answer is almost certainly yes.
In contrast to the threat made by the 1999 IPPRA Bill, the equal
remedies provision conditions states' receipt of a specific remedy for
certain conduct on their recognition that private entities may recover
the same remedies against them-the states-for the same conduct.
Section 3 features a "property type-by-property type" waiver,
wherein if a state wishes to be able to recover damages for trademark
infringement, it must waive immunity for damages suits for trademark
infringement. There is thus a direct correlation between each part of
the condition and the end it seeks to realize-a state may only sue to
recover the same type of remedy for injury by a private entity that the
private entity would be entitled to recover if the positions of the
litigants were reversed. 32 It is an "in-kind" exchange, and "both the
231. 2003 IPPRA Bill, supra note 16, § 2(1).
232. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2002 about the 2001 IPPRA
Bill (S. 1611, whose conditional waiver provision was identical to section 3 of the 2003
bill), Marybeth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights, maintained:
[T]he virtue of S. 1611 is that there is a direct nexus between the conditional
benefit and the subject of the desired waiver, so that copyright owners can get
money damages if the States waive, and the States can get monetary damages
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benefit given to the state and the condition attached to the benefit...
serve the same constitutional purpose, which is '[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries...."'233
Denying the states federal damages remedies for infringement of
their intellectual property rights helps ensure that the states will have
no unfair commercial advantage in the intellectual property market.
It helps eliminate the incentive states have to infringe with impunity,
and it equalizes the remedies available to victims of infringement
regardless of their status as a public or private entity. Whether or not
a state waives its sovereign immunity, the equal remedies provision
guarantees that federal law will entitle them to recover only those
remedies that others are allowed to recover against them. Section 3
satisfies the "germaneness" prong of "Dole with bite," for the
conditional waiver is not just sufficiently related to Congress's
legislative purpose-it is narrowly tailored to accomplishing that
precise purpose through constitutional means.23
b. Mere Coercion or Unconstitutional Compulsion?
Under the "Dole with bite" test, the answer to the question of
whether a conditional offering by the federal government to a state is
unconstitutionally coercive does not hinge on the "degree" of
coerciveness (e.g., traditional Dole analysis often posited whether, if
the Congress threatened to withhold a greater percentage of funds to
South Dakota, that degree would have pushed the federal coercion
past the compulsion breaking point). One of the central principles of
Nollan/Dolan is that compulsion turns on the character of the
pressure, not its amount. This principle indicates that if the Congress
could constitutionally make good on its threat and withhold the
also. So there is a real nexus and a real proportionality to [Senator Leahy's]
solution.
2002 Senate Hearing, supra note 20.
233. Bohannan, supra note 159, at 313 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); cf.
Berman, et al., supra note 145, at 1155 ("[Clonditioning individual types of intellectual
property protection (e.g., patent, copyright, plant variety, etc.) on a state's waiver of
immunity in suits challenging infringement of that same type of property... make[s] [the
bill] even likelier to survive.").
234. Interestingly, at least one observer who predicted that Section 3 would fail a
unconstitutional conditions test seems to believe that even the 1999 IPPRA Bill's "opt in"
system would have met germaneness requirements. See Childers, supra note 23, at 1112
("the germaneness requirement would not likely be an obstacle to legislation granting
federal intellectual property benefits in exchange for waiver of state sovereign
immunity").
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offering at issue, then the amount withheld is not dispositive. 235 The
conditional offering withheld, in turn, determines the character of the
pressure. Whether the pressure is compulsive would thus seemingly
turn simply on the question of whether Congress can constitutionally
prohibit a state from seeking damages when its intellectual property
rights are infringed-whether the states' ability to recover such
damages is a benefit to which states are entitled or a gift that can be
rescinded.m
Is this "absolutist" analysis necessarily apt, however? Indeed, the
more important federal intellectual property rights are argued to be,
the more the analysis cuts in favor of the conclusion that their denial
would be the imposition of a sanction as opposed to simply the refusal
to confer a gift.27 Though many argue that Congress has a plenary
power to grant and withhold intellectual property rights as it pleases,
the strenuous arguments made in favor of the legislation cut in favor
of the concession that the ability to hold intellectual property rights
themselves. Following through with analysis, however, gives little
further ammunition to opponents of the 2003 IPPRA Bill's equal
remedies provision. After all, the 2003 IPPRA Bill's direct alignment
of the remedies of states and private individuals-itself a connection
that enhances the germaneness of the condition-must
correspondingly be less coercive than if the condition entailed a
threat of a total rescission of state ability to own intellectual property.
Supporters of the equal remedies provision certainly have an
answer ready to the "absolutist" question of whether damages are a
gift or a benefit. As discussed, the more "hawkish" contingent have
already argued that Congress is under no obligation to bestow federal
intellectual property rights to anyone, and that therefore they are
inherently rescindable.23 Due process arguments notwithstanding, the
more moderate supporters noted how making good a threat of
235. Berman, et al., supra note 145, at 1144-46. Note that, despite the clearer lines it
attempts to draw, the interpretation of Nollan/Dolan in Berman, et al., never suggests that
the issue of degree has no place as a factor in coercion/compulsion analysis of "benefit vs.
gratuity." One could imagine a type of federal offering the amount of which, up to a
certain point, would be seen as a state entitlement or "benefit," not properly rescindable
in any event; yet one could also imagine additional offerings or "gratuities" made above
this floor, the rescission of which would offend no constitutional entitlement of the state.
236. See infra Part III.B.
237. Cf Childers, supra note 23, at 1113 (quoting Bone, supra note 73, at 1479, n. 41)
(.'[g]iven the long history... of federal intellectual property rights, it seems likely that the
Court will include federal patents and copyrights in the set of baseline entitlements and
thus classify their denial as unconstitutional coercion."')
23& See infra Part IV.A.
2005] LEVELING THE IF PLAYING FIELD
rescission would defy the bill's essential appeal to fairness. Damages,
however, are a different story-as noted, the purpose and effect of
their rescission stand as the hallmark of the equal remedies
provision's germaneness. In addition to the more accommodating
aspects of the bill in general,' 39 Section 3 explicitly equalizes the
remedies available to private intellectual property rights holders and
states, for instance making damages available only to those states that
allow themselves to be sued for damages. The legislation at no time
conditions state receipt of intellectual property rights on state
willingness to waive sovereign immunity. Regardless of whether a
state waives immunity, it will still be permitted to participate in the
intellectual property system, and protect its intellectual property
rights. The caveat is that the state will only be able to protect its
intellectual property against private infringement via injunction-the
same burden private parties face when they sue states that do not
waive their sovereign immunity.
The next step in the analysis is fairly predictable; however, the
argument that rescission of states' ability to sue for damages under
the statute leaves them with a right without a remedy is hardly
convincing. The injunctive remedy remains available to the states in a
non-waiver scenario just as it remains for the private parties. Viewing
the issue divorced from the abrogation context, supporters of the
equal remedies provision are confident that no legal doctrine
recognizes that damages for an injury inhere in all cases to the states
and only yet in some cases for private parties suffering precisely the
same injury, simply because the states are who they are. If the federal
government is not unconditionally obligated to afford one with the
remedy, how can it be obligated to afford the remedy to the other?
The courts likewise seem confident that private parties are able to
protect their rights in intellectual property with injunctions2 m
To find that states need the greater remedy would be to give the
states protection that private individuals have never received;
regardless of whether the parties are situated equally (and many
commentators continue to assert that that is not the case) it is
doubtful that courts will think much of the argument that states
somehow have some greater inherent, constitutional entitlement to
239. See 2003 IPPRA Bill, supra note 16, § 3. For example, the provision giving the
states two years from enactment to adopt statutes that comply with the waiver provision
helps accommodate the concerns of those state research institutions that fear they will be
caught defenseless because their legislatures will not respond quickly enough.
240. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
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damages than private citizens.24' Therefore, Section 3 does not
unconstitutionally coerce state waiver of sovereign immunity under
the "Dole with bite" analysis.
2. Withstanding Criticism
The equal remedies provision of the 2003 IPPRA Bill passes the
"Dole with bite" test. Critics can certainly argue, though, that "Dole
with bite's" incorporation of unconstitutional conditions analysis
focuses too much on general germaneness and coercion theory and
not enough about the specific constitutional right waived in this
instance-a sovereign immunity against suit inhering only to the fifty
states themselves. The hallmark of unconstitutional conditions, argue
some, is that Congress cannot rescind based on a condition something
that it may well have the power to rescind unilaterally.242 Surely, as
explored briefly in Dole's "no independent bar" provision, Congress
cannot condition its conferral of the offering on a state's taking some
unconstitutional act. Unconstitutional conditions does, to be sure, ask
something more-namely, whether the recipient of the governmental
offering is being forced to give up a constitutional right in exchange
for the offering.243 Sovereign immunity, as opponents of the IPPRA
are apt to point out, is one of the most fundamental constitutional
rights a state can have.2 4 William Thro, perhaps the most strident
opponent of the IPPRA in all its inceptions, cites the "automatically
passed" dicta245 from College Savings in an attempt to elaborate this
argument. He argues that the equal remedies provision must be per se
unconstitutional, because the dicta must mean that when sovereign
immunity is involved, there can be no deals, no arrangements, and no
pressure (no matter how benign) that can ever be used to induce
241. See Cotner, supra note 168, at n. 117 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415, 1416, 1424) ("The courts have held
the term 'unconstitutional conditions' to encompass "personal liberties of speech,
association, religion and privacy.... [C]urrent constitutional law treats most governmental
benefits as 'gratuities': matters of political grace to be deferentially reviewed.").
242 Id at 1150 ("The whole point of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that
the greater power to withhold a benefit entirely does not always include the lesser power
to offer it on a condition. The challenge then becomes how to determine whether the
greater includes the lesser in this case.").
243. Cotner, supra note 168 at n.117 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan) ("The
'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine 'holds that government may not grant a benefit on
the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold that benefit altogether.').
244. See Thro, supra note 22.
245. See infra Part III.A.3.
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waiver.2 Taken strictly at face value, this language would indeed
seem to doom any type of arrangement whatsoever that involves the
states waiving their sovereign immunity in exchange for a federal
benefit.
Thro cannot be correct in his assessment, however, because
settled precedent (uncontested in College Savings) holds that state
sovereign immunity is alienable: a state has the right to waive or
otherwise contract away its immunity, much like .a criminal has the
right to waive his Fifth Amendment rights.247 Assuming states are
rational actors, they would certainly have no inherent incentive to
waive what is in essence a "get out of suit free card." Therefore, as a
logical matter, only countervailing pressure that outweighs a state's
benefit from remaining immune to suit will impel its decision to
waive. A condition that requires the state to waive a right that is itself
alienable cannot, per se, be "unconstitutional"-else, the recognized
ability to waive the right would be illusory. The only question
remaining then is whether Congress is prohibited from intentionally
creating the condition. Fortunately, the coercion and germaneness
analyses of "Dole with bite" has already addressed this exact issue:
Congress's removal of the damages remedy for non-waiving states is
directed specifically toward restoring by legal contract the parity that
was once imposed by abrogation in the Remedy Clarification Acts,
and does nothing that Congress could not otherwise do independently
of the condition at issue.
246. See, e.g., Thro, supra note 22, at 36-38 (assessing the constitutionality of
constructive waivers and concluding that there is a per se prohibition on any
Congressionally-obtained conditional waiver of sovereign immunity). It is very arguable
that because Justice Scalia wrote the College Savings dicta in reference to a Parden-style
constructive waiver (not a conditional waiver wherein states knowingly waive their
immunity) the "automatically passed" language does not apply to knowing and voluntary
state waivers of immunity, such as the one provided for in Section 3's equal remedies
provision.
247. See infra Part II.B. Moreover, beyond Thro's hasty grouping of all forms of
conditional waiver under the general category of constructive waiver, see supra note 22, at
33-39, his reasoning remains based on irretrievably vague and subjective conceptions that
do little to help clear up the confusion surrounding unconstitutional conditions. For
instance, he writes: "[I]f the National Government tells the State that it must waive
sovereign immunity or be punished, the required waiver is unconstitutional. However, if
the National Government informs the State that it must waive as a condition of receiving a
benefit, and the inducement is not coercive, then the waiver is constitutional." See id at
n.103. Yet, as discussed earlier, "punishment" and "coercion" are relative concepts, and
must in any event inhere to most any relationship between parties. See supra note 172 (see
text accompanying note). To deem their mere specter in such a relationship dispositive of
the greater question of compulsion cannot resolve the question of how much coercion is
"too much."
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V. Conclusion
Time has run out on the House's and Senate's opportunity to
pass the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act before the
end of the 108th Congress.
Moreover, in deference to many of the criticisms lobbied against
the 2003 IPPRA Bill-and notwithstanding at least one supporter's
observation that "[t]he current version of the Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act... is the optimal solution to the problems
of the intellectual property regime created by Florida Prepaid and
College Savings Bank" 24 -serious questions do remain about the
ultimate effectiveness of the legislation. No matter how deftly the
equal remedies provision may walk the constitutional tightrope, the
IPPRA as a whole is by no means a perfect solution. Belying its
potential success is an inherent tension between the need to
sufficiently deter state infringement of intellectual property rights on
the one hand, and the need to abide by the courts' constitutional
edicts on the other. The more the bill is strengthened to survive
constitutional attack, the less likely it will be to meet its objective,
because of the loopholes it will open up. Likewise, the more the bill
tries to address those loopholes, the closer it comes to imposing
unconstitutional conditions on the states.249
Many criticisms of the legislation have merit. There certainly is
no guarantee that the equal remedies provision will serve as an
effective incentive for states to waive their sovereign immunity.
Congress may well decide that, irrespective of the constitutional
issues surrounding the bill, states will opt to take the equal remedies
provision in stride, and rely on the injunctive remedy that the bill
leaves unaffected. Such an eventuality will do little to help private
parties recover damages against states, and members Congress could
certainly decide simply to shelve the bill rather than burn political
bridges-especially with public universities in their home states that
248. Quigley, supra note 19, at 2027.
249. See, e.g. 2003 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Prof. Paul Bender).
Professor Bender has argued strenuously that the legislation should not only remove non-
waiving states' ability to recover damages for infringement of their intellectual property
rights, but that they should also be stripped of their ability to seek injunctions to halt such
infringement, as having absolutely no remedy available at law or at equity will naturally
increase the states' incentive to waive.
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may employ thousands of voting constituents2---on legislation whose
effectiveness is not easily predictable.
Regardless of these issues, however, the equal remedies
provision of the 2003 IPPRA Bill is constitutional, and Congress
should insert the provision in whatever succeeding version of the
IPPRA that is bound to be proposed in the 109th Congress. The
legislation builds on the proposals of its aggressive predecessor, but at
the same time its more moderate and narrowly-tailored conditional
waiver approach bolsters its chances of surviving constitutional
challenge, and helps Congress to traverse the constitutional minefield
that doomed its previous legislative attempts to protect intellectual
property rights from state infringement. It is a reasonable,
proportionate and constitutionally sound response to a loophole that
has enabled bald-faced state infringement of intellectual property
rights-a loophole whose opponents insist increasingly threatens the
health of the American economy by adversely impacting intellectual
property owners and investors both here and around the world. The
principles that underlie the equal remedies provision are, although
perhaps more subtle than ones enshrined in the Eleventh
Amendment, no less prominent in stature. Indeed, just as the
Constitution demands invalidation of federal laws that offend state
sovereign immunity, surely that same Constitution stands ready to
validate federal proposals that offer states a reasonable opportunity
to help solve a problem that the states themselves have exacerbated.
250. See Childers, supra note 23, at 1117-21 (arguing the 2003 IPPRA Bill's provisions
will "interfere with longstanding, highly successful federal research and technology
transfer policy initiatives," and will run counter to the public policy goals of those
initiatives as embodied in the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(1980) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000), 35 U.S.C. §§ 41-42, 200-211, 301-
307 (2000)). Another observer has recently argued, however, that state universities
actually have four incentives to support the 2003 IPPRA Bill: first, the legislation "places
no additional burdens on technology transfer offices or the researchers and creators at
universities," and "ensures a natural environment for bargaining and innovating"; second,
"the bill will give teeth to existing university policies that prohibit infringement of private
[IP] rights"; third, "unlike a piecemeal approach to waiver, a complete and broad waiver
by a state of sovereign immunity from [IP] suits will ensure a manageable and consistent
environment regarding immunity"; and finally, the legislation gives state universities "the
opportunity... to demonstrate their influence on their state legislators." Quigiey, supra
note 19, at 2029.
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